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Tuesday, October 25, 2011

Now Mines are to be PRIVATISED! Mining Amendment was Passed with this agenda. Profit sharing is an Eyewashing only! Health and Education and Energy services have been already been Privatised! Indian Sky is Open to Foreign AIRLINES. PSUs are Being DIV

Now Mines are to be PRIVATISED! Mining Amendment was Passed with this agenda. Profit sharing is an Eyewashing only! Health and Education and Energy services have been already been Privatised! Indian Sky is Open to Foreign AIRLINES. PSUs are Being DIVESTED! Natural Resources have to be Sold Out to Foreign Capital! We would see, Water also be PRIVATISED very soon. Like Electricity, Seeds and Fertiliser, Indian Peasants have to Pay for IRRIGATION. And No Resistance at all! No Occupy Wall Street! We ahve an ANNA Team Off Course for Corporate Lobbying!

I have seen all the DEVAs and Devils and now watch them to align with the Zionist Nuclear Global Post Modern Order of Mass Detruction!

India clears policy to build new industrial zones

Union cabinet approves national manufacturing policy


Federal cabinet approves Rs 30 bn equity infusion in NABARD

RBI deregulates savings deposit rate; cost of funds to rise

Indian Holocaust My Father`s Life and Time - SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY

Palash Biswas

http://indianholocaustmyfatherslifeandtime.blogspot.com/




http://basantipurtimes.blogspot.com/

Now Mines are to be PRIVATISED! Mining Amendment was Passed with this agenda. Profit sharing is an Eyewashing only! Health and Education and Energy services have been already been Privatised! Indian Sky is Open to Foreign AIRLINES. PSUs are Being DIVESTED! Natural Resources have to be Sold Out to Foreign Capital! We would see, Water also be PRIVATISED very soon. Like Electricity, Seeds and Fertiliser, Indian Peasants have to Pay for IRRIGATION. And No Resistance at all! No Occupy Wall Street! We ahve an ANNA Team Off Course for Corporate Lobbying!

I have seen all the DEVAs and Devils and now watch them to align with the Zionist Nuclear Global Post Modern Order of Mass Detruction!

I have worked in the Jharkhand Coal Fields for Four Years since 1980 as a Professional Journalist. I invetigated Illegal Mining and Mines Accident. I was involved in Jharkhand Movement and had been linked to leaders like Comrade AK Roy, Vinod Bihari Mahato, Shibu Soren and the the team! I had watched Cooliery Kamgar Union and witnessed MIFIA WAR Live.

For last Three decades , I have been visiting the Aborigine Indigenous Huamnscape and have seen the EXCLUSION, Displacement, Ethnic Cleaning and REPRESSION all on the name od DEVELOPMENT, Law and Order, Democracy and development! Since 1991 , i have watched how MNCs and Corpoarte India have taken over Centarl India and Naturally Abundant Tribal Regions all over the Country!

Brahaminical Media, Intelligentsia, Civil Society, NGOs and the Political parties Push Hard on Divestment and Privatisation, Infrastructure and Development! On whose Cost? They have accomplished COMPLETE Mind Control as no less than the Illuminati Families Rockfeller and Rothschild have created an excellent Networtk in India!



 

Mining Legislation

The Mines and Minerals (Development and  Regulation Act, 1957, ('MMDR') and the Mines Act, 1952, together with the rules and regulations framed under them, constitute the basic laws governing the mining sector in India.

The relevant rules in force under the MMDR Act, are the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960, and the Mineral Conservation and Development Rules, 1988. The health and safety of the workers is governed by the Mines Rules, 1955 created under the jurisdiction of the Mines Act, 1952.

The Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 outline the procedures and conditions for obtaining a Prospecting Licence or Mining Lease. The Mineral Conservation and Development Rules, 1988 lays down guidelines for ensuring mining on a scientific basis, while at the same time, conserving the environment. The provisions of Mineral Concession Rules and Mineral Conservation and Development Rules are, however, not applicable to coal, atomic minerals and minor minerals. The minor minerals are separately notified and come under the purview of the State Governments. The State Governments have for this purpose formulated the Minor Mineral Concession Rules.

ACT

RULES

NOTIFICATION

http://mines.nic.in/minleg.html

The government will review Coal India's performance again in December and also expressed hope that the PSU will record an all-round development by then. 

Coal Minister Sriprakash Jaiswal and Coal India Chairman N C Jha had met early this month to review the company's performance in the first half of the current fiscal. 

Th PSU, which accounts for 80 per cent of the domestic coal production had missed its half yearly target by about 20 million tonnes (MT) due to heavy rainfall in August and September and just achieved an output of about 176 MT against the target of 196 MT. 

Jaiswal who met the representatives of Coal Mines Officers Association of India ( CMOI) here today appealed to them to work hard to make up for the public sector firm's production loss, an official statement said. 

For the current fiscal the target of CIL is 452 MT. Earlier, CIL had asked the government to scale down its production target for the 2011-12 financial year to 448 million tonnes (MT) from 452 MT at present, fearing it will not be able to make up for slippage in output in the first half of the fiscal. 

CIL had missed its production target last fiscal recording an output of 431 MT against the revised target of 440 MT.

Keep up to date with these results:


Keep up to date with these results:

India clears policy to build new industrial zones

India passed a flagship policy on Tuesday to encourage manufacturing by streamlining labour and environmental rules in industrial parks, a move it says is key to create jobs and keep Asia's third-largest economy on a fast-growth track.


Business leaders welcomed the news, which will be a boost for Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, whose second-term agenda of big-ticket economic reforms has been knocked off course by corruption scandals and a lack of clear leadership.


With an eye to its emerging market rival China, India is desperate to ramp up goods exports and revamp a manufacturing sector that has struggled to be competitive since before economic liberalisation in 1991.


"China has done it, Germany has done it, now India has decided to do it," Trade Minister Anand Sharma told reporters after unveiling the policy to build at least seven new industrial parks.


India's economic boom has seen average economic growth of over 8 percent annually in recent years but job creation has been very low -- worrying for a country which needs to absorb about 20 million new workers each year.


Sharma said the new policy sought to create 100 million new jobs within a decade. In the same period, the government aims to lift manufacturing's share in gross domestic product to 25 from about 16 percent now, the level at which it has stagnated for more than 30 years.


The plan to slash regulation in at least seven special zones in the notoriously bureaucratic country has been in the works since last year but was held up by objections from the labour ministry, under fire from unions.


Dipanker Mukherjee, general secretary of the Centre of Indian Trade Unions, said the new policy was created without consulting workers and would be opposed "lock, stock and barrel" if it did not protect workers' rights.


But Confederation of Indian Industry said the new policy will "revolutionize" the manufacturing sector in the country and will help India head off a global economic slowdown.


"The announcement of the policy at this critical time would generate momentum, resulting in long term positive impact on growth aspirations," the industry lobby group's chief Chandrajit Banerjee said in a statement.


The zones will be developed by the federal and state governments along with the private sector to provide infrastructure such as ports and airports as well as freeing up labour rules -- including easing regulations on wage payouts if a company closes.

Union cabinet approves national manufacturing policy
The union cabinet Tuesday gave its nod to the national manufacturing policy that aims to create 100 million additional jobs by 2025 and develop mega industrial zones with world-class infrastructure facilities and flexible labour and environment regulations.

The Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs headed by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh approved the policy that also aims to increase the share of manufacturing in the economy to 25 percent from the current around 16 percent.

According to the policy, the government would help establish National Manufacturing Investment Zones with world-class infrastructure and investment friendly regulations to boost manufacturing activities.

"China has done it, Germany has done it, Japan has done it and now India has decided to do it," Commerce and Industry Minister Anand Sharma told reporters after the cabinet meeting here.

RBI deregulates savings deposit rate; cost of funds to rise
The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) on Tuesday deregulated savings deposit interest rate, the last administered bank rate in the economy, in a move which will push up cost of funds, sending bank shares sharply lower.

"It is felt that the time is appropriate to move forward and complete the process of deregulation of rupee interest rates," Reserve Bank of India said in its second-quarter monetary policy review. The deregulation is with immediate effect, the RBI said.

Currently, the savings rate stands at 4 percent, which was last raised in May after remaining unchanged for 8 years.

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has stipulated that each bank will have to offer an uniform rate of interest on savings bank deposits upto 100,000 Indian rupees ($2,007). Above that, it may provide differential rates of interest.

The market gave a thumbs down to the proposal with shares of major lenders State Bank of India , HDFC Bank , Axis Bank , Bank of Baroda , Allahabad Bank

falling as much as 2-6 percent. The key banking sector index was down 2.66 percent in recent trade.

"It will definitely increase cost of funds for banks towards maintaining current account savings account deposit growth," Moses Harding, head of global markets group, IndusInd Bank said. IDBI Bankexecutive director R.K.Bansal said that he expects the savings rate to rise to 6 percent.

Bansal estimates that banks with lower share of savings rate deposits will take a 10-20 basis points hit on margins, while banks with larger share of savings account deposits will see a 40-50 basis points fall.

Already banks' cost of funds have gone up after the RBI mandated that banks calculate interest paid on savings deposits on a daily basis while the savings bank rate was last raised by 50 basis points.

Savings deposits are a source of low-cost funds for banks, which form 22 percent of banks' total deposit base and 13 percent of savings of the household sector.

This makes it a politically sensitive interest rate as savings deposits are held largely by households, particularly in rural areas where financial literacy is not widespread.

New age private banks are likely to aggressively move now to mop up low cost deposits, which traditionally has been the prerogative of the larger banks.

"We will have to digest it now," said N.S. Srinath, executive director, Bank of Baroda. "We will have to analyse the impact, because the gap between savings rate and term deposit rate is quite huge."

Term deposit rates are as high as 11 percent for several banks for some tenors making the spread over the savings rate large.

RBI had prepared a discussion paper last November on deregulation of savings bank deposit rate which spelt out both the pros and cons of deregulating the interest rates on savings deposit.

While RBI said that the deregulation will aid in monetary transmission, Indian lenders were not in favour of the proposal citing market volatility.

They had said they would be forced to raise transaction charges for ATM, money transfers and cheque books to protect margins.

($1 = 49.825 Indian Rupees)

Federal cabinet approves Rs 30 bn equity infusion in NABARD
Federal cabinet approved equity infusion of 30 billion rupees in state-run National Bankfor Agriculture and Rural Development or Nabard, information and broadcast minister Ambika Soni said on Tuesday.

The government has said it had plans to infuse capital in state-run banks and the largets lender State Bank of India is expected to receive funds worth 45-80 billion rupees by March 2012.

Mining Policy
India has newly proposed a mining policy which aims to curtail illegal mining and empower people settled in and around mining areas. The new Bill proposes that companies share 26% of the profits from mining with the locals who lose land. The Bill seeks to expedite the grant of mineral concessions in a transparent manner and attract big investments in the sector.
25 October 2011 Last updated at 22:14 GMT

Latest Articles on Mining Policy

Mining: Orissa seeks hike in royalty rates, ban on ore exports
Blaming the Centre's "lopsided policies" for tardy progress of the mineral-rich state, Orissa Chief Minister Naveen Patnaik on Saturday demanded an up...
Banning iron ore export from Goa one of the possibilities: Shah Commission
Putting a ban on the iron ore export from Goa is one of the possibilities explored by the Shah Commission during its investigations into the illegal m...
New policy for faster acquisition of overseas mineral assets
According to the secretary, companies with a three-year track record of profitability are covered by the policy.

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http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/fullcoverage/mining-policy

25 OCT, 2011, 03.59AM IST, ET BUREAU

India's coal economy will get a boost if private miners are allowed entry


Coal India Ltd.

BSE

324.65

00.00%

00.00

Vol:424758 shares traded

NSE
323.90
-00.20%
-00.65
Vol:3614659 shares traded
Prices|Financials|Company Info|Reports

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In an interview to this paper, coal minister Sriprakash Jaiswal fretted that inefficiency, theft and graft consume at least a quarter of the output of state-owned behemoth Coal India (CIL). We agree with his diagnosis, but not with his incremental approach to boosting efficiency and cracking down on graft within CIL. There is a better way to do things. CIL today is a listed company, one of India's most valuable, with thousands of institutional and retail shareholders.

They will put pressure on CIL to do better and the company will have to respond. However, the coal mining giant lacks any rivals in the market and, therefore, any competitive fire in its belly. This is a lack that Jaiswal can address. He should devote all his energies to scrapping the 1973 law that nationalised all coal mines and helped create CIL. Today, 28 years after nationalisation, no player can vie with CIL to explore for coal or mine it.

The only exceptions, under two amendments made in 1976 and 1993, are for steelmakers and power producers who have access to captive coal mines, to extract the mineral and use it for fuel in their units. Both nationalisation and captive mining are policy disasters. It is time to do away with them.

Exploration and mining of minerals are specialised activities that should not be left to monopolies or companies for which mining is secondary. Mining companies should be allowed into coal mining, to compete with CIL and nudge it towards greater efficiency.

Makers of steel and power should buy iron ore or coal from miners and focus on their core areas of expertise. Worldwide, specialised miners have been seen to be more innovative and efficient extractors of minerals than if the activity is left to other companies. Steel companies, for example, will tend to focus their energies on making steel.

Mining, for them, will always be a least-cost, scrappy activity. India's total likely coal reserves are estimated at around 275 billion tonnes. Of this, only a fraction, 550 million tonnes, is used every year. A lot lies unexplored and we'll need advanced technology to mine many reserves that are now considered out of bounds. Let private investments from specialised miners come into the coal field.
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/opinion/coal-econ-to-get-a-boost-if-pvt-miners-are-allowed/articleshow/10481581.cms

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25 OCT, 2011, 07.37PM IST,

NRIs returning to India: Avail the benefits given under tax laws

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By Girish Shetty & Abhishek Rao, Senior Tax Professionals, Ernst & Young

It is praise worthy weakness of a man to love the places where he played in his childhood, where he was educated, where he dwelt and call back to the mind his childhood pleasure. The recent fears of recession in the west compounded by the growth story in India, as well as the lure of returning to one's own motherland may change the minds of many Indians who have settled abroad to return to India permanently.

This may mean that they could be looking at resettling in India by selling their property abroad which they would have acquired whilst being there. This decision may not be just an emotional one but would have to factor other perspectives like taxation, exchange control regulations etc, which may significantly impact the decision of shifting back to India and its timing.

Subin, a person of Indian origin, was employed in the US for the past several years. He wants to return to India permanently. He owns several assets in the US such as a residential property, a car, and investment in shares in US based companies. He has also invested in mutual funds there. He is pondering on whether to sell his property in US before he returns to India permanently, but wants to get his car to India and if permitted, retain his investments in the US.

While discussing his idea of coming back to India permanently with a friend, he found out that there were certain advantages that he could derive in case he qualifies as a Non-Resident (NR) in India under theIndian tax laws. He also found out that the simplest way to qualify as a NR in India is to spend less than 60 days in India in any particular tax year, which runs from April 01 to March 31 of the subsequent calendar year. Accordingly, Subin has planned his return in such a way that he qualifies as a NR in India in the year in which he returns to India.

His decision to return to India would have both direct and indirect tax implications, such as income tax, wealth tax and customs duty. He would also need to take note of implications from an exchange control regulations perspective.

The implications under each of the above mentioned laws need to be understood distinctly. As per the Indian income-tax laws, NRs are taxable in India only on income which accrues in India or is received in India. In the case of an NR, once an income is earned and received outside India and it is brought to India at a later date, it would not be taxable in India.
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/nri/returning-to-india/nris-returning-to-india-avail-the-benefits-given-under-tax-laws/articleshow/10488516.cms

The Planning Commission today said that the economy could do better than 7.6 per cent growth for this fiscal as projected by the Reserve Bank of India in its half yearly monetary policy review.

"I think, it (economy) might do better 7.6 per cent (this fiscal. But you cannot rule out 7.6 per cent," Planning Commission Montek Singh Ahluwalia told reporters here.

The Reserve Bank today lowered the economic growth forecast to 7.6 per cent for the current fiscal. The central bank had earlier projected the Indian economy to grow by 8 per cent in 2011-12, lower than 8.5 per cent recorded in 2010-11.

"Slower global growth will have an adverse impact on domestic growth, particularly on industrial production, given the rising inter-linkages of the Indian economy with the global economy," RBI said in its Monetary Policy Review.

About the raising short-term lending and borrowing rate by 25 basis points (0.25 per cent), Ahluwalia said, "It is more or less on expected lines. They have rasied the repo rate by 25 basis point but RBI also said no more rate hike. I think that market can sense that this one more effort (to tame inflation)".

On deregulating the saving bank account interest rate, he said, "I have always been in favour of deregulating the saving banking (interest) rates. Keeping it fixed have been an illogical thing, so it is a good news".

The Reserve Bank today lowered theeconomic growth forecast to 7.6 per cent for the current fiscal even as it expressed hope that inflationwill start coming down from December.

"Slower global growth will have an adverse impact on domestic growth, particularly on industrial production, given the rising inter-linkages of the Indian economy with the global economy," RBI said in its Monetary Policy Review.

The RBI had earlier projected the Indian economy to grow by 8 per cent in 2011-12, lower than 8.5 per cent recorded in 2010-11.

"While growth in advanced economies is already weakening, there is a risk of sharp deterioration if a credible solution to the euro area debt problem is not found," RBI said.

Besides inflation, the RBI said slowdown in project investments was also impacting growth.

The overall inflation has remained above 9 per cent since December 2010. It was 9.72 per cent in September.

"Elevated inflationary pressures are expected to ease from December 2011. The projection for WPI inflation for March 2012 is kept unchanged at 7 per cent," RBI said.

The RBI also indicated that it might not go in for another rate hike in its mid-quarterly review in December 16, provided the inflation does not shoot up further.

"If the inflation trajectory conforms to projection, further rate hikes may not be warranted," RBI said.

It said that concerted policy focus is needed to generate adequate supply response in respect of items such as milk, eggs, fish, meat, pulses, oilseeds, fruits and vegetables.

"Structural imbalances in protein rich items will persist. Production of pulses this year is expected to be lower than last year. Consequently, food inflation is likely to remain under pressure," RBI said.

Food inflation, which account for 14 per cent in the overall inflation, stood at a six month high of 10.60 per cent.

The industry has said the 25 basis point rate hike by the Reserve Bank will further weaken economic growth, but expressed relief at the central bank's hinting at a pause in pushing up the lending rates.

The industry welcomed the RBI move to deregulate savings bank interest rates, a step which lenders said could fetch better returns for depositors as competition will intensify.

"Yet another interest rate hike (effected) by the RBI will further weaken economic growth and impact all other indicators," industry chamber AssochamPresident Dilip Modi said today.

However, the central bank has hinted that it may not hike the short term policy rates further.

"One of the main positives of the RBI policy is the indication that it will not raise policy rates further... The second positive is the savings rate deregulation which will give banks more freedom," CII Director General Chandrajit Banerjee said.

Expressing similar views, Ficci Secretary General Rajiv Kumar said, "There was a definite statement of intent from RBI on ruling out further rate increases in December.

"The deregulation of saving bank deposit rate is a welcome move and is likely to lead to increased product innovations across banks through more competition."

Ficci, however, expressed concern as to whether smaller banks would be able to compete in the market with the larger banks after this move.

RBI today hiked interest rates by 25 basis points. With this, the short term lending (repo) and borrowing (reverse- repo) rate now stand at 8.5 per cent and 7.5 per cent respectively. This is the 13th hike in a span of 20 months to tame inflation.

ELIGIBILITY TO COAL MINING

Amendments to Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973 already done to facilitate captive mining.

                     Under the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973 Coal mining was mostly reserved for the public sector. By an amendment to the Act in 1976, two exceptions to policy were introduced viz.(i) captive mining by private companies engaged in production of iron and steel and (ii) sub-lease for coal mining to private parties in isolated small pockets not amenable to economic development and not requiring rail transport. Considering the need to augment thermal power generation and to create additional thermal power capacity during the VIII Plan period, the Government decided to allow private participation in the power sector.

                      The Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973 was amended with effect from 9th June, 1993 to allow coal mining for captive consumption for generation of power, washing of coal obtained from a mine and other end uses to be notified by Government from time to time, in addition to the existing provision for captive coal mining for production of iron and steel. The amendment was carried out in Section 3(3)(a)(iii) of the Act by a Gazette Notification dated 9.6.93. Under the powers conferred on the Central Government by Section 3 (3) (a) (iii)(4) of the Act, another Gazette Notification has been issued on 15.3.96 to allow production of cement as an end use for captive mining of coal.

                       The June, 1993 amendment to the Act as well as the Gazette Notification of 15.3.96 apply to both the public sector and private sector companies desiring to mine coal for captive consumption. The restriction of captive mining does not apply to the Government-owned Coal Companies and mineral development like CIL and  SCCL and the  Mineral Development Corporations of the State Governments.

ELIGIBILITY

The eligibility to do coal mining in the country has been laid down in the provisions in Section 3 (3) of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973. The parties eligible to do coal mining in India without the restriction of captive consumption are:-

  1. The Central Government, a Government company (including a State Government company), a Corporation owned, managed and controlled by the Central Government.

  2. A person to whom a sub-lease has been granted by the above mentioned Government, company or corporation having a coal mining lease, subject to the conditions that the coal reserves covered by the sub-lease are in isolated small pockets or are not sufficient for scientific and economic development in a coordinated manner and that the coal produced by the sub-lessee will not be required to be transported by rail.

2. As per the provisions in Section 3 (3) (a) (iii) of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973, a company engaged in the following activities can do coal mining in India only for captive consumption:-

production of iron and steel

generation of power

washing of coal obtained from a mine, or

such other end use as the Central Government may, by notification, specify.

2.1 Under the powers vested with the Central Government by virtue of Section 3 (3)(a) (iii)(4) of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973, a Gazette Notification was issued on 15.3.96 to provide cement production as an approved end-use for the purpose of captive mining of coal. Therefore, the cement producing companies are now eligible for undertaking coal mining for captive consumption.

2.2 In addition to Coal India Limited (CIL) and Singareni Collieries Company Limited (SCCL) , the following companies are also doing coal mining in India now:-

Tata Iron & Steel Company Limited (a captive coal mining company in the private sector)

Damodar Valley Corporation (a captive coal mining company in the public sector)

Indian Iron & Steel Company Limited (a captive coal mining company in the public sector)

Bihar State Mineral Development Corporation Limited (a non-captive coal mining company, a Government company under the control of Government of Bihar)

Jammu & Kashmir Minerals Limited (a non-captive coal mining company, a Government company under the control of Government of J&K)

Bengal Emta Coal Mines Limited (a captive coal mining company in the private sector)

Jindal Steel and Power Limited (a captive coal mining company in the private sector)

3. Special  dispensations provided for setting up of associated coal companies by the end -user parties offered captive coal blocks .

Any of the companies engaged in any of the approved end-uses indicted in paras 2 and 2.1 above can itself mine coal from a captive coal block. Some of the private companies who were offered captive coal blocks expressed their difficulties to do coal mining in the country on the ground of lack of experience in coal mining. Keeping in view the difficulties experienced by such companies, the Government have now allowed the following dispensations:-

(a) A company engaged in any of the approved end-uses can mine coal from a captive block through an associated coal company formed with the sole objective of mining coal and supplying the coal on exclusive basis from the captive coal block to the end-user company, provided the end-user company has at least 26% equity ownership in the associated coal company at all times.

(b) There can be a holding company with two subsidiaries i.e. (i) a company engaged in any of the approved end-uses and (ii) an associated coal company formed with the sole objective of mining coal and supplying the coal on exclusive basis from the captive coal block to the end-user company, provided the holding company has at least 26% equity ownership in both the end-user company and the associated coal company..

Coal Mining Lease under the Mines and Minerals (Regulation & Development) Act, 1957.

                       Under the provisions of Section 5 (2) of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973, the Coal India Limited enjoys the status of becoming the deemed lessee of the concerned State Governments in relation to all the nationalised coal mines. Under the provisions of Section 11 (2) of the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition & Development) Act, 1957 also, the Coal India Limited acquires the same status of becoming deemed lessee of the concerned State Governments in relation to the lands over the coal bearing areas acquired under this Act. The deemed leases being in the nature of statutory leases, the Coal India Limited does not have to obtain separate leases under the MMRD Act, 1957 from the concerned State Government in respect of the nationalised mines and the coal bearing lands acquired under the CBA Act. However, in case any of the companies eligible to do coal mining in the country including CIL and the other Government and private coal companies want to acquire coal bearing lands under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, they will be required to obtain coal mining leases from the concerned State Governments under the MMRD Act, 1957. Coal being a mineral listed in the First Schedule of the MMRD Act, 1957, the State Governments can grant coal mining leases only with the previous approval of the Central Government accorded under the proviso to Section 5 (1) of MMRD Act. Before the previous approval of the Central Government is accorded, the coal mining company is required to get the mining plan for the proposed coal mining area approved from the Central Government. The coal mining leases under the MMRD Act are now granted for 20-30 years initially and can be renewed for a further period of 20 years with the previous approval of the Central Government. The coal mining leases under the MMRD Act, 1957 are ordinarily subject to the a ceiling of 10 sq. kms. of area.


25 OCT, 2011, 04.44PM IST, ECONOMICTIMES.COM

RBI raises policy rates by 25 bps; home and auto loans

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By PersonalFN

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) in its quarterlymonetary policy review has raised policy rate by 25 bps or 0.25% on both Repo and Reverse Repo rates.

The anti-inflationary stance by the RBI has led to 13th consecutive rate hike in the last 18 months since March 2010.

The repo rate is the rate at which RBI lends to banks, now stands at 8.50%.

The reverse repo rate at which banks park their surplus with RBI now stands at 7.50%.

While the cash reserve ratio (CRR) remains unchanged at 6%.

This rate hike will make the cost of borrowing costlier for banks, who may in turn pass on the burden in the form of costlier borrowing to the end consumers or loan seekers. Home and auto loan EMIs will increase once banks start raising their base rate, while other loans like personal, education as well as the corporate loans are also likely to become costlier.

On the other hand, the announcement of deregulation of savings bank deposit interest rates (with immediate effect) will bring relief to the savers who maintain a huge surplus into their savings account to meet day to day requirement and contingency needs.

The RBI has however defined a slab of Rs. 1 lakh upto which the banks will offer uniform interest rate on savings bank deposits and provide differential rates of interest for deposits over Rs. 1 lakh.

This change will prove beneficial only to people who have and maintain huge surplus into their Savings account and will not benefit the lower income group or a savings account of the earning member of a middle level family.

So suppose you being in a high end bracket maintain a daily balance of Rs. 1,50,000/- into your savings account, then at the rate of 4% p.a. you would have earned a half yearly interest of Rs. 3,000/- over a period of 6 months.

Now with the new regulation coming in and say your bank offers interest rate @ 6% p.a. for your deposits over Rs. 1 lakh, then you will earn a half yearly interest of Rs. 3,500/- over a period of 6 months instead.

Your first Rs. 1 lakh deposit @ 4% p.a. will earn you a half yearly interest of Rs. 2,000/- and the next Rs. 50,000/- deposit @ 6% p.a. will earn you a half yearly interest of Rs. 1,500/-. So you earn an additional Rs. 500/- on half yearly basis on your immediate liquidity funds
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/markets/analysis/RBI-raises-policy-rates-by-25-bps-home-and-auto-loans-to-get-costlier/articleshow/10487803.cms

Mining has provided the answer to the manufacturing and energy needs of the humanity in the past century. Mining community around the world has contributed to the enrichment of the world through industrial development. Minerals are valuable natural resources being finite and non-renewable. They constitute the vital raw materials for many basic industries and are a major resource for development.
Demand for minerals is expected to grow very fast, due to increasing levels of consumption, infrastructure development, and growth of the economy. Management of mineral resources has, therefore, to be closely integrated with the overall strategy of development and exploitation of minerals is to be guided by long-term national goals and perspectives.
In India, 80% of mining is in coal and the balance 20% is in various metals and other raw materials such as gold, copper, iron, lead, bauxite, zinc and uranium. India with diverse and significant mineral resources is the leading producer of some of the minerals. India is not endowed with all the requisite mineral resources. Of the 89 minerals produced in India, 4 are fuel minerals, 11 metallic, 52 non-metallic and 22 minor minerals.
India is the largest producer of mica blocks and mica splittings; ranks third in the production of coal & lignite, barytes and chromite; 4th in iron ore, 6th in bauxite and manganese ore, 10th in aluminium and 11th in crude steel. Iron-ore, copper-ore, chromite and or zinc concentrates, gold, manganese ore, bauxite, lead concentrates, and silver account for the entire metallic production. Limestone, magnesite, dolomite, barytes, kaolin, gypsum, apatite & phosphorite, steatite and fluorite account for 92 percent of non-metallic minerals. The index of mineral production, excluding fuel and atomic minerals, (base year 1993-94=100) for the year 2005-06 is expected to be 154.23 as compared to 153.48 in 2004-05.
Life Indices: Important non-fuel Minerals
Mineral/ Ore/ Metal Recoverable reserves estimated as on 1.4.2000 (Based on exploration/ prospecting) Figure in million tonnes unless otherwise specified Life Index (years) (m.tonnes)
Bauxite 2462* 211
Copper metal (tonnes) 5297,000 80
Lead metal (tonnes)) 2381,000 45
Zinc metal (tonnes) 9707,000 45
Gold metal (tonnex) 68* Not Estimated
Iron ore 13460* 131
Chromite Ore 97 46
Magnesite 245* 542
Manganese Ore 167* 47
Limestone 75679* 254
Phosphorite (Rock Phosphate) 142 79
Sillimanite 516* Very large
Garnet 52* 90
Kyanite ( tonnes) 2817000* 265
Dolomite 4387* 438
Diamond ( Thousand carats) 982* 19
* Recoverable reserves estimated as on 1.4.1995.

Regulation of Minerals
Management of mineral resources in India is the responsibility of the Central Government and the State Governments in terms of Entry 54 of the Union List (List I) and Entry 23 of the State List (List II) of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. The Central Government in consultation with the State Governments, formulates the legal measures for the regulation of mines and the development of mineral resources to ensure basic uniformity in mineral administration and to ensure that the development of mineral resources keeps pace, and is in consonance with the national policy goals. The regulation of mines and development of mineral resources in accordance with the national goals and priorities is the responsibility of the Central and State Governments.
The role to be played by the Central and State Governments in regard to mineral development has been extensively dealt in the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 and rules made under the Act by the Central Government and the State Governments in their respective domains. The provisions of the Act and the Rules are reviewed from time to time and harmonised with the policies governing industrial and socio-economic developments in India.
The Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 lays down the legal frame-work for the regulation of mines and development of all minerals other than petroleum and natural gas. The Central Government has framed the Mineral Concession Rules 1960 for regulating grant of prospecting licences and mining leases in respect of all minerals other than atomic minerals and minor minerals. The State Governments have framed the rules in regard to minor minerals. The Central Government has also framed the Mineral Conservation and Development Rules, 1988 for conservation and systematic development of minerals. These are applicable to all minerals except coal, atomic minerals and minor minerals.
National Mineral Policy
A national mineral policy has evolved over the years in India. The policy emphasizes the need for conservation and judicious exploitation of finite mineral resources through scientific methods of mining, beneficiation and economic utilisation. Simultaneously, it keeps in view the present & future needs of defence and development of India and strives to ensure indigenous availability of basic and strategic minerals to avoid disruption of core industrial production in times of international strife.
The basic objectives of the mineral policy in respect of minerals are:
(a) to explore for identification of mineral wealth in the land and in off-shore areas;
(b) to develop mineral resources taking into account the national and strategic considerations and to ensure their adequate supply and best use keeping in view the present needs and future requirements;
(c) to promote necessary linkages for smooth and uninterrupted development of the mineral industry to meet the needs of India;
(d) to promote research and development in minerals;
(e) to ensure establishment of appropriate educational and training facilities for human resources development to meet the manpower requirements of the mineral industry;
(f) to minimise adverse effects of mineral development on the forest, environment and ecology through appropriate protective measures; and
(g) to ensure conduct of mining operations with due regard to safety and health of all concerned.
According to the policy, induction of foreign technology and foreign participation in exploration and mining for high value and scarce minerals shall be pursued. Foreign equity investment in joint ventures in mining promoted by Indian companies would be encouraged. While foreign investment in equity would normally be limited to 50%, this limitation would not apply to captive mines of any mineral processing industry. Enhanced equity holding can also be considered on a case to case basis. In respect of joint venture mining projects of minerals & metals in which India is deficient or does not have exportable surplus, a stipulated share of production would have to be made available to meet the needs of the domestic market before exports from such projects are allowed. In case of ores whose known reserves are not abundant, preference will be given to those who propose to take up their mining for captive use.
The policy also addresses certain aspects and elements like mineral exploration in the sea-bed, development of proper inventory, proper linkage between exploitation of minerals and development of mineral industry, protection of forest, preference to members of the scheduled tribes for development of small deposits in scheduled areas, environment and ecology from the adverse effects of mining, enforcement of mining plan for adoption of proper mining methods and optimum utilisation of minerals, export of minerals in value added form and recycling of metallic scrap & mineral waste.

For Fee Based detailed analysis & value added information on this Sector, please contact us at info@IndiaCore.com


http://www.indiacore.com/mining.html

Mining in India

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Darya-i-Noor diamond from theIranian Crown Jewels, originally from the mines of Golconda, Andhra Pradesh.

Mining in India is an important economic activity which contributes significantly to the economy of India.[1] The mining sector underwent modernization following the independence of India although minerals have been mined in the region since antiquity.[1] The country exports a variety of minerals—found in abundance its geographically diverse regions—while it imports others not found in sufficient quantities within its geographical boundaries.[1] Several techniques for mining are employed in the country and a significant part of the country lies unexplored for mineral wealth.[1]

[edit]Overview

The tradition of mining in the region is ancient and underwent modernization alongside the rest of the world as India gained independence in 1947.[2] The economic reforms of 1991 and the 1993 National Mining Policy further helped the growth of the mining sector.[2] India's minerals range from both metallic and non-metallic types.[3] The metallic minerals comprise ferrous and non-ferrous minerals while the non metallic minerals comprise mineral fuels, precious stones, among others.[3]
D.R. Khullar holds that mining in India depends on over 3100 mines, out of which over 550 are fuel mines, over 560 are mines for metals, and over 1970 are mines for extraction of nonmetals.[2] The figure given by S.N. Padhi is: 'about 600 coal mines, 35 oil projects and 6000 metalliferous mines of different sizes employing over one million persons on a daily average basis.'[4] Both open cast mining and underground mining operations are carried out and drilling/pumping is undertaken for extracting liquid or gaseous fuels.[2] The country produces and works with roughly 100 minerals, which are an important source for earning foreign exchange as well as satisfying domestic needs.[2] India also exports iron ore, titanium,manganese, bauxite, granite, and imports cobalt, mercury, graphite etc.[2]
Unless controlled by other departments of the Government of India mineral resources of the country are surveyed by the Indian Ministry of Mines, which also regulates the manner in which these resources are used.[5] The ministry oversees the various aspects of industrial mining in the country.[5] Both the Geological Survey of India and the Indian Bureau of Mines are also controlled by the ministry.[5] Natural gas, petroleum and atomic minerals are exempt from the various activities of the Indian Ministry of Mines.[5]

[edit]History

Indian coal production is the 3rd highest in the world according to the 2008 Indian Ministry of Mines estimates.[6] Shown above is a coal mine in Jharkhand.

Flint was known and exploited by the inhabitants of the Indus Valley Civilization by the 3rd millennium BCE.[7] P. Biagi and M. Cremaschi ofMilan University discovered a number of Harappan quarries in archaeological excavations dating between 1985-1986.[8] Biagi (2008) describes the quarries: 'From the surface the quarries consisted of almost circular empty areas, representing the quarry–pits, filled with aeolian sand, blown from the Thar Desert dunes, and heaps of limestone block, deriving from the prehistoric mining activity. All around these structures flint workshops were noticed, represented by scatters of flint flakes and blades among which were typical Harappan-elongated blade cores and characteristic bullet cores with very narrow bladelet detachments.'[9] Between 1995 and 1998, Accelerator mass spectrometry radiocarbon dating dating of Zyzyphus cf. nummularia charcoal found in the quarries has yielded evidence that the activity continued into 1870-1800 BCE.[10]
Minerals subsequently found mention in Indian literature. George Robert Rapp—on the subject of minerals mentioned in India's literature—holds that:
Sanskrit texts mention the use of bitumen, rock salt, yellow orpiment, chalk, alum, bismuth, calamine, realgar, stibnite, saltpeter,cinnabar, arsenic, sulphur, yellow and red ochre, black sand, and red clay in prescriptions. Among the metals used were gold,silver, copper, mercury, iron, iron ores, pyrite, tin, and brass. Mercury appeared to have been the most frequently used, and is called by several names in the texts. No source for mercury or its ores has been located. leading to the suggestion that it may have been imported.[11]

[edit]Geographical distribution

The distribution of minerals in the country is uneven and mineral density varies from region to region.[2] D.R. Khullar identifies five mineral 'belts' in the country: The North Eastern Peninsular Belt, Central Belt, Southern Belt, South Western Belt, and the North Western Belt. The details of the various geographical 'belts' are given in the table below:[12]

Mineral Belt

Location

Minerals found

North Eastern Peninsular Belt

Chota Nagpur plateau and theOrissa plateau covering the states of Jharkhand, West Bengal andOrissa.

Coal, iron ore, manganese, mica, bauxite, copper, kyanite, chromite, beryl, apatite etc. Khullar calls this region the mineral heartland of Indiaand further cites studies to state that: 'this region possesses India's 100 percent Kyanite, 93 percent iron ore, 84 percent coal, 70 percent chromite, 70 percent mica, 50 percent fire clay, 45 percent asbestos, 45 percent china clay, 20 percent limestone and 10 percent manganese.'

Central Belt

Chattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh,Madhya Pradesh and Maharastra.

Manganese, bauxite, uranium, limestone, marble, coal, gems, mica, graphite etc. exist in large quantities and the net extent of the minerals of the region is yet to be assessed. This is the second largest belt of minerals in the country.

Southern Belt

Karnataka plateau and Tamil Nadu.

Ferrous minerals and bauxite. Low diversity.

South Western Belt

Karnataka and Goa.

Iron ore, garnet and clay.

North Western Belt

Rajasthan and Gujarat along theAravali Range.

Non-ferrous minerals, uranium, mica, beryllium, aquamarine, petroleum, gypsum and emerald.


India has yet to fully explore the mineral wealth within its marine territory, mountain ranges, and a few states e.g. Assam.[12]

[edit]Minerals

The distribution of minerals in India according to the United States Geological Survey.

Along with 48.83% arable land, India has significant sources of coal (fourth-largest reserves in the world), bauxite, titanium ore, chromite, natural gas, diamonds, petroleum, and limestone.[13] According to the 2008 Ministry of Mines estimates: 'India has stepped up its production to reach the second rank among the chromite producers of the world. Besides, India ranks 3rd in production of coal & lignite, 2nd in barites, 4th in iron ore, 5th in bauxite and crude steel, 7th in manganese ore and 8th in aluminium.'[6]
India accounts for 12% of the world's known and economically available thorium.[14] It is the world's largest producer and exporter of mica, accounting for almost 60 percent of the net mica production in the world, which it exports to the United Kingdom, Japan, United States of America etc.[15] As one of the largest producers and exporters of iron ore in the world, its majority exports go to Japan, Korea, Europe and theMiddle East.[16] Japan accounts for nearly 3/4 of India's total iron ore exports.[16] It also has one of the largest deposits of manganese in the world, and is a leading producer as well as exporter of manganese ore, which it exports to Japan, Europe (Sweden, Belgium, Norway, among other countries), and to a lesser extent, the United States of America.[17]

[edit]Production

The net production of selected minerals in 2005-06 as per the Production of Selected Minerals Ministry of Mines, Government of India is given in the table below:

[edit]Exports

Mine shaft at Kolar Gold Fields.

The net exports selected of minerals in 2004-05 as per the Exports of Ores and Minerals Ministry of Mines, Government of India is given in the table below:

Mineral

Quantity

Unit

Mineral type

Coal

403

Million tonnes

Fuel

Lignite

29

Million tonnes

Fuel

Natural Gas

31,007

Million cubic metres

Fuel

Crude Petroleum

32

Million tonnes

Fuel

Bauxite

11,278

Thousand tonnes

Metallic Mineral

Copper

125

Thousand tonnes

Metallic Mineral

Gold

3,048

Thousand grammes

Metallic Mineral

Iron Ore

140,131

Thousand tonnes

Metallic Mineral

Lead

93

Thousand tonnes

Metallic Mineral

Manganese Ore

1,963

Thousand tonnes

Metallic Mineral

Zinc

862

Thousand tonnes

Metallic Mineral

Diamond

60,155

Carats

Non Metallic Mineral

Gypsum

3,651

Thousand tonnes

Non Metallic Mineral

Limestone

170

Thousand tonnes

Non Metallic Mineral

Phosphorite

1,383

Thousand tonnes

Non Metallic Mineral

Mineral

Quantity exported in 2004-05

Unit

Alumina

896,518

tonnes

Bauxite

1,131,472

tonnes

Coal

1,374

tonnes

Copper

18,990

tonnes

Gypsum & plaster

103,003

tonnes

Iron ore

83,165

tonnes

Lead

81,157

tonnes

Limestone

343,814

tonnes

Manganese ore

317,787

tonnes

Marble

234,455

tonnes

Mica

97,842

tonnes

Natural gas

29,523

tonnes

Sulphur

2,465

tonnes

Zinc

180,704

tonnes

[edit]Issues with Minings

One of the most challenging issues in India's mining sector is the lack of assessment of India's natural resources.[12] A number of areas remain unexplored and the mineral resources in these areas are yet to be assessed.[12] The distribution of minerals in the areas known is uneven and varies drastically from one region to another.[2] India is also looking to follow the example set by England, Japan and Italy to recycle and use scrap iron for ferrous industry.[18]
Under the British Raj a committee of experts formed in 1894 formulated regulations for mining safety and ensured regulated mining in India.[4] The committee also passed the 1st Mines act of 1901 which led to a substantial drop in mining related accidents.[4] The accidents in mining are caused both by man-made and natural phenomenon, for example explosions and flooding.[19] The main causes for incidents resulting in serious injury or death are roof fall, vehicular accidents, falling/slipping and hauling related incidents.[20]
In recent decades, mining industry has been facing issues of large scale displacements, resistance of locals, environmental issues like pollution, corruption, deforestation, dangers to animal habitats.[21][22][23][24][25]

[edit]Footnotes

  1. ^ a b c d Khullar, 631-633
  2. ^ a b c d e f g h Khullar, 631
  3. ^ a b Khullar, 632-633
  4. ^ a b c Padhi, 1019
  5. ^ a b c d Annual Report (2007-2008), Ministry of Mines, chapter 4, page 4
  6. ^ a b India's Contribution to the World's mineral Production (2008), Ministry of Mines, Government of India. National Informatics Centre.
  7. ^ Biagi, page 1856
  8. ^ Biagi, 1857
  9. ^ Biagi, 1858
  10. ^ Biagi, 1860
  11. ^ Rapp, 11
  12. ^ a b c d Khullar, 632
  13. ^ "CIA Factbook: India". CIA Factbook.
  14. ^ "Information and Issue Briefs - Thorium". World Nuclear Association.
  15. ^ Khullar, 650-651
  16. ^ a b Khullar, 638
  17. ^ Khullar, 638-640
  18. ^ Khullar, 659
  19. ^ Padhi, 1020
  20. ^ Padhi, 1021
  21. ^ http://www.freewebs.com/epgorissa/
  22. ^ http://www.indiawaterportal.org/post/9431
  23. ^ http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/content/goas-mining-problems
  24. ^ http://sp.lyellcollection.org/cgi/content/abstract/250/1/141
  25. ^ http://www.indiatogether.org/environment/mining.htm

[edit]Bibliography

  • Annual Report (2007-2008), Ministry of Mines, Government of India, National Informatics Centre.
  • Biagi, Paolo (2008), "Quarries in Harappa", Encyclopaedia of the History of Science, Technology, and Medicine in Non-Western Cultures (2nd edition) edited by Helaine Selin, pp. 1856–1863, Springer, ISBN 978-1-4020-4559-2.
  • Padhi, S.N. (2003), "Mines Safety in India-Control of Accidents and Disasters in 21st Century", Mining in the 21st Century: Quo Vadis? edited by A.K. Ghose etc., Taylor & Francis,ISBN 90-5809-274-7.
  • Rapp, George Robert (2002), Archaeomineralogy, Springer, ISBN 3-540-42579-9.
  • Khullar, D.R. (2006), "Mineral Resources", India: A Comprehensive Geography, pp. 630–659, Kalyani Publishers, ISBN 81-272-2636-X.

Coal mining in India

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 This article does not cite any references or sources. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (July 2008)
Coal reserves in BTUs as of 2009

Coal mining in India has a long history of commercial exploitation covering nearly 220 years starting from 1774 by M/s Sumner and Heatly of East India Company in the Raniganj Coalfield along the Western bank of river Damodar. However, for about a century the growth of Indian coal mining remained sluggish for want of demand but the introduction of steam locomotives in 1853 gave a fillip to it. Within a short span, production rose to an annual average of 1 million tonne (mt) and India could produce 6.12 mts. per year by 1900 and 18 mts per year by 1920. The production got a sudden boost from the First World War but went through a slump in the early thirties. The production reached a level of 29 mts. by 1942 and 30 mts. by 1946.

With the advent of Independence, the country embarked upon the 5-year development plans. At the beginning of the 1st Plan, annual production went up to 33 mts. During the 1st Plan period itself, the need for increasing coal production efficiently by systematic and scientific development of the coal industry was being felt. Setting up of the National Coal Development Corporation (NCDC), a Government of India Undertaking in 1956 with the collieries owned by the railways as its nucleus was the first major step towards planned development of Indian Coal Industry. Along with the Singareni Collieries Company Ltd. (SCCL) which was already in operation since 1945 and which became a Government company under the control of Government of Andhra Pradesh in 1956, India thus had two Government coal companies in the fifties. SCCL is now a joint undertaking of Government of Andhra Pradesh and Government of India sharing its equity in 51:49 ratio.

[edit]Nationalisation of Coal Mines

Right from its genesis, the commercial coal mining in modern times in India has been dictated by the needs of the domestic consumption. India's has abundant domestic reserves of coal. Most of these are in the states of Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and West Bengal.[1] On account of the growing needs of the steel industry, a thrust had to be given on systematic exploitation of coking coal reserves in Jharia Coalfield. Adequate capital investment to meet the burgeoning energy needs of the country was not forthcoming from the private coal mine owners. Unscientific mining practices adopted by some of them and poor working conditions of labour in some of the private coal mines became matters of concern for the Government. On account of these reasons, the Central Government took a decision to nationalise the private coal mines. The nationalisation was done in two phases, the first with the coking coal mines in 1971-72 and then with the non-coking coal mines in 1973. In October, 1971, the Coking Coal Mines (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1971 provided for taking over in public interest of the management of coking coal mines and coke oven plants pending nationalisation. This was followed by the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972 under which the coking coal mines and the coke oven plants other than those with the Tata Iron & Steel Company Limited and Indian Iron & Steel Company Limited, were nationalised on 1.5.1972 and brought under the Bharat Coking Coal Limited (BCCL), a new Central Government Undertaking. Another enactment, namely the Coal Mines (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1973, extended the right of the Government of India to take over the management of the coking and non-coking coal mines in seven States including the coking coal mines taken over in 1971. This was followed by the nationalisation of all these mines on 1.5.1973 with the enactment of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973 which now is the piece of Central legislation determining the eligibility of coal mining in India.[2]

[edit]References

  1. ^ http://www.krishnaninc.com/Power_India_01.pdf
  2. ^ http://www.coalindia.in/Company.aspx?tab=4&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1

[edit]See also

  1. 1965 Dhanbad coal mine disaster
  2. Coal Mining & Mistris of Kutch


  1. ^ http://www.krishnaninc.com/Power_India_01.pdf
  2. ^ http://www.coalindia.in/Company.aspx?tab=4&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1
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Overview of Coal Mining in India: Investigative Report from Dhanbad Coal Fields

June 21, 2011

mines4.jpgmines1.jpg

[This is an investigative report on the coal mining industry in Dhanbad-Jharia belt, including a very detailed analysis of the politics and socioeconomics of the industry and the region where it is located - Ed.]

By: http://workerseducation.net

The following report was written after a two weeks visit in Dhanbad-Jharia, one of the main coal mining areas in India. Seeing the area and talking to the coal-mining comrades of the Revolutionary Socialist Party (Marxist-Leninist) was insightful and inspired us to dig a bit deeper into the historical material of Dhanbad-Jharia. From the past and present of this area we can raise important general questions for the wider political debate about capitalist development, re-composition of the working class and the state regime.

Contents

I
Ia. Introduction
Ib. Overview on Coal Mining in India

II
IIa. The Dhanbad-Jharia Coal-Mining Area
IIb. The Coal-Mining Sector during Colonialism and after 'Independence'
IIc. The Period 1971 to 2011: A Short Summary
IId. The Nationalisation 1971 – 1973

III
IIIa. The Illegalised Mining
IIIb. The Dhanbad Mafia
IIIc. The Jharkhand Movement
IIId. The Mechanisation
IIIe. The Casualisation and (Re-)Privatisation
IIIf. The Situation Today: A Visit in Dhanbad

********

Ia. Introduction

Dhanbad, India – Report from a Visit in the Coal Fields

* Jharia coal fields are a rural industrial area. Debates and research about the formation of the working class tend to focus on urban industries and 'slum cities', while quantitatively, at least in the global South, rural industries keep on being an important sphere in the process of proletarianisation. Around 70 per cent of the population in India might still live in rural areas, but only a small minority survives as peasants. The step into urban areas is still a big step, too big for many landless, therefore a large share of proletarians in the country-side make their first industrial experiences in the rural areas themselves. Coal mining in the Dhanbad-Jharia area started on a significant scale in the early 19th century and formed a base for the development of the early working-class generations in India.

* There was and still is a particular importance of the product coal itself, as an energy resource needed for industrial development – currently the regime in India sources around 60 per cent of it's total energy from coal and has become the third largest coal producer globally. Total coal production has increased nearly sevenfold between 1980 and 2010 and India's coal imports increased during recent years. Instead of 'being plundered by imperialism' India-based steel companies increasingly invest in mines in Australia, the US and Africa. But India's energy regime is squeezed: after the nuclear disaster in Japan in early 2011 the path towards nuclear energy is contested, protest against the construction of reactors is gathering strength [1]. India has to import most of its oil and gas – a difficult source given the inflated trade deficit and shell-shocked global oil prices. On the background of this squeeze, coal mining seems a bad, but the only stable option for the near future.

mines2.jpg

* Capitalist development depends not on the mere availability of a specific energy resource, but also on its (preferably low) price for generally profitable conditions. The global crisis from the mid-1960s onwards pushed the Indian regime into nationalisation of the mining industry in order to centralise the command over productivity – the state of Emergency was the political 'repressive' side of re-structuring. By the end of the 1980s the mechanisation drive in the India mining industry crashed into the contradiction of capitalist productivity: output productivity increased, but production costs per ton did not come down enough. The debt crisis from the 1990 onwards focused the attack on labour costs again: casualisation and outsourcing of mines. Since the 2000s the 'commodity price bubble' increased the importance of mining beyond the immediate profits from production. In India the mining areas are increasingly militarised – the 100,000 para-military forces of 'Operation Greenhunt' are part of the investment regime. Current steps to privatise the world's biggest coal mining company Coal India Limited – by launching a record initial public offering raising 3.5 billion USD in late 2010 – has also to be seen as an desperate attempt to deal with the rapidly increasing state debts in a global crisis.

* Both output and low price depends on the control over the undesired by-product of coal mining: the control over a large mass of potentially unruly industrial workers. In the mining areas re-composition of the working class through migration, 'uneven development' and technological attacks is a constant process. We can see in a very concentrated local space and time struggles 'within a proletariat' which represent the main lines of segmentation of the global working class today. The proletariat in Dhanbad has many faces: the pauperised Adivasi ('indigenous') and 'rural poor' population at the fringes of the mining areas – main base for the Maoist armed insurrection; the village workers in the 'illegal mines'; the casualised workers in the main mines earning ten per cent of their permanent work-mates; the unemployed sons and daughters of local peasants and permanent workers, organised in an 'unemployed movement'. As a whole the local work-force is under-layered by various waves of migration since the 19th century.

* This peculiar composition of the local work-force and industry brought about very specific forms of 'mediation' of class struggle. Dhanbad became infamous for its 'mafia', a particular network which 'organised' the reproduction of the working-class through money-lending and labour contracting; which reproduced itself materially as transport contractors, by illegal mining and later on real estate deals; which provided the Coal India management with both gangs of strike-breaking thugs and large integrative trade union organisations; and developed strong links with the political class. The 'mafia-mode of production' was not an irregularity, but a kind of complementary department, outsourced by the nationalised industry. The trade union / mafia connection in Dhanbad was historically and essentially paralleled, e.g. by the regime of Boyles United Mining Workers in the US of the 1960s and 1970s. By the 1990s the liquid force of neoliberal policies dissolved the mafia into 'normal business'.

* Parallel to, and over the time increasingly intertwined with the 'mafia', a 'regionalist liberation movement' developed, demanding a Jharkhand state independent from Bihar – the Dhanbad-Jharia mining area used to form part of southern Bihar. The Jharkhand movement first tried to mobilise the impoverished Adivasi population against 'the outsiders', but fairly quickly included non-Adivasi 'Jharkhandis', who had come to the area in the early 20th century and had developed 'local economic' interests in a separate state. After nationalisation around 50,000 mainly 'local' mining workers were replaced by 'outsiders' within the space of weeks; this gave material back-up for the regionalism, last but not least within segments of the working class. The emerging Maoist-influenced movement, e.g. in form of the Marxist Coordination Committee (MCC), provided the regionalist movement with an ideology of 'anti-feudal class alliance', later on the subaltern discourse of 'indigenous identity' helped to integrate segments of the proletariat into the 'state project'.

* The 'regionalist project' seems discarded since the formation of Jharkhand state in November 2000 and its unaltered repression and displacement of the 'Jharkhandi' proletariat. Today the working class in the Dhanbad-Jharia area has to discover and re-compose itself through its own activity. The class conflicts in the area are relentless; they reach from strikes in the mines, to piquetero-type blockading actions of the unemployed, to protests and riots against displacement and environmental damage, attacks on mining infrastructure. The questions raised by these fragmented local struggles – united by the mines and mining work – are global questions.

Back to Contents

Ib. Coal Mining in India

We want to give a brief overview on the current scope of coal mining and consumption in India [2].

In 2009, India (526 million tonnes) was the third biggest hard coal producer after China (2,971 Mt) and the USA (919Mt). 85 per cent of coal is produced by Coal India Limited (CIL), the world largest coal mining company, currently employing around 380,000 permanent workers and running around 500 mines in India.

Around 55 per cent of energy production in India stems from coal, compared to around 3 per cent from nuclear energy. Around 75 per cent of total coal stock is consumed by the energy sector. Global market prices for coking coal increased by 70 per cent during 2010 – the regime in India is forced to import coal for energy production and at the same time put more pressure on production costs 'at home'.

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Production costs in India are 35 per cent higher compared to Australia, Indonesia or South Africa, which is not due to higher wages, but lower out-put productivity. The Coal India Ltd. subsidiary SCCL claimed in 2010 that wage costs account for 44 per cent of total production costs. The average mechanised mine in India had an out-put of 3.8 tons per man-shift in 2008, while manual mines operate on levels of 0.4 tonnes. In comparison, the United Colliery in Australia reports to achieve an output per man shift of 65 tonnes. In order to increase productivity there is a shift towards large scale open pit mining. In 2005 around 80 per cent of coal production in India came from open-cast mining, this compares to 20 per cent in 1971. The underground production declined from 50.56 to 43.54 million tonnes during the period 2001 to 2008.

The imports of coal increased rapidly over the last three years, from 59 million tonnes in 2008-9 to 73 million tonnes in 2009-10 to 84 million tonnes in 2010-11. There is also a significant increase in direct investment of steel manufacturing companies from India in coal mining companies in the US, Africa and Australia, while CIL in turn outsources whole open-cast mines to international companies and companies previously only engaged in transport and logistics.

Total coal production in India
1945 30 Mt
1972 72 Mt
1979 89 Mt
1992 200 Mt (by Coal India Limited alone)
2001 345 Mt (by Coal India Limited alone)
2011 526 Mt (out of which 430 Mt by Coal India Limited)

Estimated official work-force before nationalisation
1951 350,000
1972 1,100,000

Permanent workers at CIL
1981 700,000
2003 650,000
2008 450,000
2011 380,000

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IIa. The Dhanbad-Jharia coal-mining area

Dhanbad coal fields are situated in the state of Jharkhand in the East of India, neighbouring West Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. The Dhanbad-Jharia area forms part of a mineral rich corridor, most of India's reserves in coal, copper, iron ore and uranium are located in the Durgapur-Dhanbad-Bokaro-Jamshedpur triangle. Industrial coal mining started in the second half of the 19th century, subsequently both steel manufacturing and power generation came up in the region. Bokaro is known as India's steel city, location of India's biggest steel plant, and currently major investment hub for ArcelorMittal and other multinationals. The steel industry attracted manufacturing industries. After having set-up their steel plant in 1907, Tata opened their truck plant in Jamshedpur in 1945 [3]. In 1952 Nehru opened the Sidri fertilizer plant, which he called 'temple of development' and which became the symbol of 'independent' India's industrial 5-years plan regime and cornerstone of the Green Revolution [4]. Up to the early 1980s around one fifth of India's total public infrastructure and industrial investment went to this 'Ruhr Area' of India. The mining and industrial clusters are surrounded by agriculturally backward and jungle-dominated areas. The 'local' population in these areas belong to the poorest rural sections in India. They have become important bases for the Maoist armed struggle.

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The Dhanbad-Jharia coal fields form part of this heavy industrial triangle. They are a rural mining area, with about 110 official coal mines and probably the same amount of unofficial mines. They are India's main centre for coking coal, a particular sort of coal important for steel production. Scattered in the region are the vast open-cast mines, interspersed with villages and miners colonies. Trucks loaded with coal and heavy machinery dominate the scenery, interrupted by push-carts and bicycles – loaded with coal. The Dhanbad-Jharia region is said to be one of the most polluted areas of the world. Mining in itself is a rather forceful intervention in the environment, but capitalist social relations have resulted in forms of mining, which aggravate the attack on nature and, as part of it, on the human bodies. The productivity drive towards open-cast mining has increased the dust production, the whole area is covered with fine coal dust, causing epidemic respiratory suffering. In order to cut costs, many mines – and not only the unofficial mines – are not re-filled with sand, once the coal is extracted. This results in gas accumulation, underground explosions, underground fires and caving in of whole areas. Since years a large-scale underground fire burns under the surface of Jharia, under the living area of about 600,000 people. [5] Here and there the earth cracks open, gas, smoke and flames emerge. Skeletons of trees, burnt from within. Jharia was declared eviction area in the early 1980s, an official master-plan was set-up to re-located hundred of thousands of residents, but was either not put into place or displaced people were not given compensation – which increased the resistance of people towards being displaced, be it for mining or for 'their own safety' in order to escape the underground flames.

The industry destroys nature and harms humans – and it creates a different social environment. The industry brings together thousands of people from all corners of Northern India, they live in village-type of settlements, but without the traditional village hierarchies of caste, individual land-ownership and agricultural dependency. Neither is the social atmosphere polluted by the urban stress and feeling of anonymity. One of the major divisions and tragic separation which capitalist development creates is the division into town and village. The town offers a break-away from the misery and cultural oppressiveness of the village, but this urban freedom turns out to be a mirage, hiding stress, lack of breathing-space and social coldness. There seems to be no alternative to this quasi natural dichotomy and the communist trajectory to abolish both village and town seems utopian. The Dhanbad-Jharia coal-fields are everything but a utopia, but they demonstrate that there is a material link between form of community and social activity; that because of the mining work the atmosphere in the villages is more intimate than in a town and more egalitarian than in a traditional agricultural village; that there is the potential of an alternative. Manual workers, degraded and trapped by centuries of caste-based division of labour and still largely culturally oppressed are praised by heroic monuments in the mining region. The acknowledgment of working class' social power is petrified in the miner's statues, which can be seen in many squares of Dhanbad area. At the same time we can see the looming nightmare once mining capital would leave the area as the main social cohesive and source of income – yet another desolate place of stranded individuals. The question will be whether we manage to turn the current, destructive form of industrial socialisation into something better.

The atmosphere within the mining village is one of relative equality – if we ignore the structural gender inequalities, also imposed by the ban of female employment in the official mines. But between the mining villages themselves are significant differences, reflecting the hierarchies within the mining work-force. This becomes visible in the Bhuli colony, which was built by the Coal India in the mid-1970s, after nationalisation. It was the biggest industrial housing scheme in Asia at the time, comprising schools, hospitals and other 'planned infrastructure' for the about 40,000 mine-working residents – while appealing to their rural background by leaving some space for gardening and animal husbandry. If we compare this housing scheme with the current conditions, where a well-planned Industrial Model Town would feature all kinds of access roads and industrial infrastructure, but no provision for workers' accommodation what-so-ever, Bhuli seems like a proof for the 'worker-friendly' character of the nationalisation of mining industry. These company colonies seem the 'role-model' of a welfare-type of capitalism-socialism. But more than that Bhuli is an expression of spacial separation within a divided work-force. During the first weeks of nationalisation around 50,000 to 60,000 mainly local workers – some people stress the fact that a lot of them were Dalits (untouchables) and Santhals (tribals) – were replaced by better paid 'permanent workers', who mainly came from other regions of Bihar and who were accommodated – and separated – in townships like Bhuli. Today Bhuli or Munidih Project, like many other 'colonies' of permanent workers of Coal India, look rather run-down. The three-room family houses with separate gardens are rented to the workers for about 150 Rs a month (they earn about 1,000 Rs a day), but they officially have to be returned when workers retire. No worker has been made permanent since the early 1990s, in Munidih Project colony around 25 per cent of the houses are empty. There are constant struggles of both company and administration against 'illegal squatters'. Nowadays the majority of mining workers are hired through contractor or work in unofficial mines. They live in the villages surrounding the mines, some of them are still referred to as 'tribal villages'. They lack the infrastructure of the colonies, they are even more threatened by displacement, but they are 'mining villages' in the sense that their economic and social daily life evolves around the mines, either by direct employment or related services.

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IIb. The Coal-Mining Sector during Colonialism and after 'Independence'

In the following we have at the historical development of the mining industry and workers' struggle in the area – from the 'Colonial Times' to 'Independence' after 1945 and nationalisation of the mining industry in 1971-3. On this background we then focus on the re-structuring process which took place since then: through 'mafia mode of production', mechanisation and casualisation.

Colonial Times

In the Dhanbad area, mining activities on an industrial level started by the mid-19th century. Before that village population engaged in small-scale mining, but mining became industrialised only with the colonial extraction efforts to connect the main trading and manufacturing centres with the ports via rail-ways. Mines were mainly 'privately-owned', although factions within the colonial regime proposed nationalisation. Early on the mining industry developed a separation into large mines, often employing over a thousand people, and small mines operated by less than 100 workers. This dualism persisted over time.

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Around the 1910s larger mines and mining workers started to get exploited by 'Indian' owners, mainly coming from Gujarat and from the Railway contracting sector. Tata opened mines in Dhanbad in 1910 in order to supply their steel plant in Jamshedpur. Already earlier on, by 1870s a 'national bourgeoisie' had developed in the textile sectors, benefiting from the global crisis, which had hit the industry in England. With some decades delay, 'Indian' mine owners started to develop links with the emerging Nationalist movement, in addition to their collaboration with the colonial regime.

In 1920 around 100,000 people were employed in the official mines in Dhanbad area, this figure rose to 150,000 during the Second World War and stayed at around 130,000 till the 1970s. The composition of this work-force changed drastically over time. Initially local population, mainly 'tribals', were employed as 'family gangs' on piece-work system. From the 1910s onwards workers arrived from as far as Gurakhpur, Patna, Allahabad and even from the Punjab. They clearly outnumbered the 'local' workers by the 1950s. The other main shift concerned the gender composition. Women mining workers accounted for nearly half of the work-force during the early phase of mining. In 1938 female employment in mines got officially banned, but the regime continued to depend on the female work-force due the increased demand for coal during the World War period. After 'Independence' female workers were expelled from the main mines and pushed into the unofficial mining fringe.

The re-placement of 'local' workers by migrant workers was part of the mine owners' effort to enforce a higher degree of work discipline. Local mining workers tend to work until their 'financial needs' were met and then stop for a while, either working on their fields or engage in other activities. Chief Inspector of mines' annual report noted in 1904: Even in normal time the Dehatis would not work regularly. Some of them worked for six or seven days at a stretch and then returned to their home for a week and rest. The migrant workers had more difficulties to escape the work regime. The other main measure to enforce regular and extended working-times was the electrification, which took place in the bigger mines from the 1920s onwards. Electrical pumps were used in order to be able to continue work during the raining season and electrical lights facilitated longer working hours in the open-cast mines. [6]

An 'official' labour movement amongst the Dhanbad miners appeared during the upsurge of workers struggles all over India after the First World War, a second wave of disputes surged in the period 1938 to 1941 and then again after the Second World War up to 1948. In that sense the local struggles followed a very generalised global rhythm. The official unions remained integrated either within the tactical 'class collaboration' of the Nationalist movement or degenerated into company unions. In late 1921, the Jharia Trade Union Congress called for strike and the bigger collieries were practically shut down for a week. A strike occurred in the Giridih coalfield in January 1923, but the workers returned unconditionally within a fortnight. The only trade union found to be in existence in the coal industry at the end of the 1920s was the Indian Colliery Employees' Association, but this association had only 2,000 members. The leadership of this union was in the hands of those who were part of the supervising staff.

In 1938 strikes took place at Bird and Co's Katrasgarh collieries. It lasted for about three months and affected about 7,000 workers. This time labour protests were accompanied by formation of trade unions. At the end of the 1930s, three registered trade unions were found to operate in the Jharia coalfield – the Indian Colliery Labour Union, the Tata's Collieries Labour Association and the Indian Miners' Association. Their numbers of members were around 3,500 respectively. This cycle of struggle was interrupted by the intensification of the Second World War and the Nationalist (Congress) backing of the Allies – the backing of the imperial British state. Coal was essential for the Allied war production, so Congress dominated trade unions were held back from any action threatening to interrupt coal supply.

In sync with mining workers in the US and South Africa and the wider Indian working class unrest, struggles re-emerged from the abyss of the World War and rocked almost entire coalfield during 1945-48, mainly relating to the sharp general price increases. In Bhowra and Amlabad colliery production stopped for around three months and thirteen days in 1948. The 'independent' state reacted with both, repression of struggles and legal integration of the official labour movement, e.g. by passing the Factory Act in 1948, which guaranteed the 'right' to formal representation, and by setting up the First Pay Commission. [7]

Independence

Similar to other industries under the colonial regime, mining as well was characterised by low level of productive investment except in a few central mines and in times of increased demand. In 1951, the regime in 'independent' India faced following situation: Around 70 per cent of all mines did not use electrical power; only around 18 per cent of the underground mines operated coal cutting machines and less than 1 per cent of the coal was mechanically loaded. During the following two decades of five years plans the state had to centralise command over coal production: a World Bank loan was used during the Third Plan to push investment in 225 central, formally still private mines. The 'developmental gap' between the main mines and the smaller, but quantitatively dominating mines widened.

Between 1951 and 1971 the number of coal cutting machines went up by 118.9 per cent; mechanical loaders and conveyors by 537.5 and 1257.0 per cent, respectively – having started from a very low level. Mechanically cut coal accounted for 32.4 of the underground output in 1971, having increased at an average annual rate of 13.5 per cent. Mechanical loading increased to 2.7 per cent. Output levels rose from around 30 Mt after the Second World War to about 72 Mt in 1971, while official employment increased from about 350,000 in 1951 to a peak-level of 450,000 in 1963. With the onset of the crisis by the mid-1960s employment dropped to around 380,000 in 1971.

Together with the central economic plans, large-scale credits and state-controlled coal prices, institutions like the central pay commissions were set-up and the Congress state-party affiliated trade union INTUC was put in high-command over the representation of the mining work-force – which included physical attacks on any other forms of workers' organisation which might have threatened the trinity of state-management-union [8]. The state in India had guaranteed price levels for coal, both for producers and industrial consumers, in the hope that stable prices would lead to more investment in the still private mines and relatively cheap energy provisions would boost the wider industrial sector.

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IIc. The Period 1971 to 2011: A Short Summary

The mining and energy regime in India was pushed through various phases of re-structuring in the rhythm with the general cycle of capitalist development and crisis. The industrial crisis from the mid-1960s onwards and particularly the oil-shock and global inflation in 1973 pushed many developing capitalist nations into dictatorial policies towards the working class, not at last towards workers in the energy sector. In India this 'crisis-regime' took the form of nationalisation of the mining sector in the early 1970s and the state of Emergency from 1975 to 1977. The 'state of Emergency' in 1975 nationalised banks and introduced a severe regime of central planning of proletarian re-production (e.g. through enforced mass-sterilisation), at the same time it 'opened' the Indian economy further to the world market and relieved big 'private' capital from taxes and custom duties: it 'liberalised' the economy. The 1980s in India were characterised by a 'stuck development'. In the mining industry this 'stuck development' was best expressed in the emergence of the Munidih Project in Dhanbad, Asian's first fully mechanised mine, in combination with a general degeneration of Coal India's profitability. The 1980s culminated in the state foreign debt crisis in 1991, which widened the attack on the working class by debt management and controlled application of market forces in order to lower wage levels. In the mining areas of Dhanbad no worker was hired on a permanent bases since 1992 and the outsourcing process of mines accelerated. Each push of re-structuring was managed by a combination of World Bank or other external loans and a re-adjustment of the legal frame-work. In each phase the regime tried to make use of both the pressure of 'market-forces' and the centralising command of burocracy and 'plan'.

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In the following sections we first locate the 'NATIONALISATION' within the crisis attack on the working class. We then see how the 'nationalisation' of the central mines solidified the 'uneven development' within the mining sector in legal terms: the law drew a sharper line between the official and the 'ILLEGALISED MINING SECTOR', while the actual production process integrated both. The merger of trade union collaboration and 'illegalised economic sector' created the back-bone of the DHANBAD MAFIA. The mafia was intrinsic part of the mining regime during the 1970s to 1990s. The specific composition of the (local/migrant) mining work-force can partly explain the populist success of the JHARKHAND MOVEMENT, the other main form of class collaboration in the Dhanbad mining area. While mafia and regionalism controlled the reproduction of the impoverished rural proletariat and the labour intensive mines, MECHANISATION in the central mines attacked the core work-force and at the same time deepened the separation between workers in the centre and the periphery of the mining industry. The crisis 1991 the re-focussed the attack on the labour costs through CASUALISATION and OUTSOURCING.

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IId. The Nationalization 1971 – 1973

Formally the coking coal collieries – main source for steel production – were nationalised in 1971, and the non-coking ones in 1973. Subsequently, all coking and non-coking collieries were merged into the Coal India Ltd. (CIL) on 1st of November 1975. [9]
First of all, the 'idea' of nationalising the mines was neither new, nor did it express any 'popular' of socialist shift within the ruling class. Factions within the colonial regime had opted for nationalisation and later on, during the Nehru developmental regime, steps towards 'centralisation' were taken, e.g. through setting up the Committee on the Amalgamation of Collieries in 1955. Formally the main mines might have been 'privately owned', but they were dependent on institutional (World Bank) credit, state controlled prices, mainly state-run industries as consumers. The mining sector itself was already very centralised: a few mining houses accounted for 70 per cent of the total output; in 1971, 34.5 per cent of the mines produced only 1.32 per cent of the total output and 60.9 per cent barely 10.6. In this sense 'nationalisation' was a rather formal step.

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The onset of the crisis by the mid-1960s forced the state towards this formal step: the wider industry was eager for lower energy input costs. It is revealing to see how the regime made use of 'controlled forces of competition' in order to implement the formal act of nationalisation – how state and market are not separate entities, but mediating forms of class power. In 1967 the state 'de-controlled' the coal prices, which passed the price pressure on to the coal producers. The railway apparatus became a main price negotiator with the mining industry. This happened for three reasons: the railways used to run their own mines and therefore had insights in mining activities; the railways were a main consumer of coal themselves; the mining industry depended on the railways for transport. The negotiated 'Loco Price' became a generalised price for the industry and pushed the 'private mines' into a formal bankruptcy by 1971.

The regime used and shaped the 'competition' of its internal apparatus, like the railways, in order to negotiate its way through the crisis. The 'class cohesion' behind this 'competition of different interests' revealed itself subsequently, once the general attack on the working class emerged. In the following years this attack hit workers in all 'competing sectors', from the mines, to the railways to the manufacturing industry. In a single week following the nationalisation of coal mines nearly 50,000 miners in the Dhanbad region lost their jobs and were partly replaced by 'newly immigrated workers'. During the first three years of nationalisation total production went up from 70 to 90 million tonnes, the fatality rate through labour accidents per thousand jumped from 0.42 in 1974 to 1.4 in 1975. In May 1974 tens of thousand railway workers were arrested during their general strike, which hinted at the general repression of workers' unrest during the State of Emergency, which was declared in the same year as when the 'state-owned' Coal India Ltd. was formed.

After nationalisation in 1971-73 it was not sufficient to merely change the formal owner-ship of mines, the actual production process had to be re-shaped. The first main shift in the Dhanbad area was a kind of selection process between mines, which were to be incorporated into Coal India Ltd. and mines to be left out in the 'illegalised fringe'. For following reason this process was the most intense in the Dhanbad-Jharia region: Coking coal reserves – coal with high energy content important for steel production – constitute only 15-20 per cent of the total Indian coal reserves and these reserves are concentrated in the two fields of Jharia and Ranigunj. In 1972, Jharia coal fields accounted for about 66 per cent of India's total output of coking coal. At the same time these coal fields were characterised by the highest share of small mines, over 300 small mines in total. The dualism of 'illegal mining' and 'centralised mines' became the sharpest in this particular area. The emergence if 'the mafia' was also based on its bridge function between these to sectors of uneven development.

The mining regime tried establishing a stable core-workforce, in certain terms 'privileged', in order to find secure conditions for the mechanisation process – while the mechanisation process in turn was driven by the 'flight' from an unruly mass of industrial workers. The wider proletarian unrest of the 1967 – 1974 period had also entered the coalfields and was only shortly interrupted by the Emergency. In 1977 workers struggles, mainly among the contract work-force, broke out again – see for example movements in the Rajhera mining area, which were brutally quelled by the post-Emergency democratic government. [10] From 1971 we can see a shift towards capital-intensive open-cast mining and intensified international cooperation with 'mining capital' from Soviet Union, Poland, Australia, Germany and the UK – which was not only a 'technology transfer', but also a transfer of experience with a century of 'class struggle management'.

The 'nationalisation' also re-defined the formal border-lines between different stages of development, by de-marketing more clearly what is called 'the illegal mining sector'.

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IIIa. The Illegalised Mining

'Illegal mining' existed before nationalisation, it emerged – it was 'illegalised' – with the introduction of land property titles and the encroachment of common land by the colonial state. The process of 'nationalisation' re-shaped the 'illegalised sector' and its relation to the 'official economy', the boundaries of a hierarchical division within the local working class were re-drawn and enforced in legal terms.
It is estimated that 20 to 30 per cent of total coal production in India stems from illegalised mines. Summarised by illegality are mines of different characters: from small-scale village mining with hardly any machinery applied to 'professional' mines employing several hundred people, which often function in collaboration with management of state-company CIL, e.g. they receive by-passed working material from the official sector. In some cases, the same mine is operated both officially and unofficially, e.g. in a Bansra mine where 44 local brick kilns purchase the illegal coal mined from the 7 feet upper layer, whereas the 18-20 feet thick lower layer is worked by CIL. Mines are 'illegalised' by CIL decision that under official CIL conditions (wages, security etc.) the exploitation is not profitable. The mine then enters the labour intensive, low wage and precarious realm, where workers are under extra-pressure of law and mafia-type of middlemen. Some of the smaller mines mainly supply the wider rural industry, such as brick-kilns, or their product is sold on local markets, e.g. for domestic use, tea stalls etc.. Other coal enters the general wider circulation via transport contractors as middlemen.

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Due to their labour intensive character illegalised mines suck in larger shares of the rural proletariat than the official mines. During the 1970s and 1980s to get a permanent job at CIL required personal connections, bribes, a certain official qualification. 'Illegalised mines' are part of the reproduction of a proletariat, which is increasingly expelled from the main mines through mechanisation and hierarchical labour markets. 'Offering jobs' and small business opportunities the illegalised mines became an important factor in local politics. It is said that no political party, which announced to close illegal mines would win a local election in Dhanbad area. The 'Jharkhand Movement' wanted to turn them into 'cooperatives', whereas later on the NGO sector saw them as 'local development opportunities'. The following two quotations demonstrate how the 'hellish character' of these mines is re-packaged as 'local development opportunity' and 'common right' by the NGO sector

"Javir Kumar, 14, works in illegal coal mines, each a "rat hole," 10 X 10 foot and 400 foot deep, where a mere slip of the foot will plunge one to a certain death. A large number of children aged below 14 are working in such mines, built unscientifically, in Jharkhand's Hazaribagh district. These mine workers are mostly from Orissa, West Bengal, Bihar, Chhattisgarh and Assam. Every five minutes, a wooden bucket brimming with coal is heaved out of a burrow. The coal is dumped on the side of the quarry before being loaded on to the waiting truck. Every day, a child mines 30-40 buckets. These mines are increasing in numbers, manned mostly by children ranging in age from 7 to 17."
(April 2011 – http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article1599973.ece)

"These are called peoples' mines and they serve a significant purpose in local economies. The article's thesis is that peasant communities are trying to claim back a portion of the local resources lost to them through appropriation by mining companies thus re-asserting their traditional rights to local mineral resources. In conclusion, the need for a new moral economy for mining regions is stressed: an economy in which local communities will play a powerful role."
(Natural Resources Forum, Volume 27, Issue 1, pages 68-77, February 2003)

Accidents in the official mines often turn into triggers for unrest. In 1996, 64 miners drowned in Dhanbad because of flooding of mine. The only forces mobilized in significant strength were the police to lathi-charge and keep at bay the angry relatives and co-workers, who sought to confront the chief minister and other VIPs. After the flooding incidents, there were spontaneous protests in many mines against unsafe working conditions. But not only work is unofficial in the 'illegalised' mines, death is, too. Officially around 800 workers died in mining accidents in Dhanbad area in the two decades between 1980 and 1990s – the unofficial number including death in the 'peoples' mines will be higher. After fatal accidents in the unofficial mines surviving relatives are often threatened by thugs to keep stumm.

During the 1970s and 1980s the illegalised mines became one of the economic and social bases for the emerging Dhanbad mafia. In the following we have a brief look at the general position of the mafia in the reproduction of class relations.

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IIIb. The Dhanbad Mafia

In India the name Dhanbad is synonymous with coal mafia. Together with the 'nationalised command' over the mines appeared a 'mafia mode of production', which was both part and outcome of the re-structuring process. The mafia is an economical and political network, which reaches from money-lending, illegal liquor shops, paid goons to illegal mining and transport contracts, which are connected to the high ranks of CIL management department. The Dhanbad mafia controlled the main trade unions, bought off the police and local administration and was well represented in the Bihar state parliament. The 'individual components' of the mafia, e.g. money-lending, gangs of musclemen or individual corruption within companies, existed before the 1960s and 1970s and they still exist – so why and under which conditions did these 'individual components' form into a cohesive structure, into 'clans' which would auction police stations between themselves and who had hundreds killed 'on demand'? In the following we want to give a short summary of the development of the mafia, in particular of its relation to workers reproduction and class conflict.

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First of all there is a specific quality to the mining industry, in terms of the product, production process and class relations, which tends towards organised violence. The mining product is a located raw material, mining requires 'struggle over and with land' and its property form. Mining can be done on very different scales: from a single person with primitive tools to large industrial enterprises. In this way mining allows 'extra-legal' appropriation and a wide range of 'modes of production'. Mining work in its form is brutal, compared to other industries the command over living labour required a higher degree of direct violence. Once performed on an industrial level mining concentrates a mass of workers, often migrant workers, who tend to depend more on middlemen. Historically and globally class struggles in the coal fields have always been characterised by its violent forms. The 1960s and 1970s have been particularly unruly decades. The fact that the main trade unions like Congress affiliated INTUC – already connected to the political class – became an organised and institutionalised form of violence used by mining capital in order to discipline workers can be seen as the material base for the development of 'the mafia'. As early as 1958 many violent attacks of INTUC cadres on AITUC (Communist Party union) were reported from Dhanbad. At that point INTUC and the coal mine owners formed a united front demanding higher guaranteed coal prices from the government. By the late 1960s and the emergence of 'Naxalite'-influenced unions like A.K. Roy's Bihar Colliery Kamgar Union (BCKU) the repression intensified and became more systematic. Here we find blatant parallels in time and space. B. P. Sinha or Suraj Deo Singh, prominent union and mafia leaders in Dhanbad in the 1970s match the brutality of a W. A. Boyle of the United Mining Workers in the US. The brutality of workers' struggle in the mines of Harlan County in the mid-1970s, the paid thugs, corrupt local police and the class collaboration of the UMWA developed similar forms to those in Dhanbad.
But brutalised, extra-legal forms of class struggle and a collaborationist trade union apparatus do not yet form a mafia. The mafia formed part of the economic cycle and production process and had a populist paternalistic element. The roots reached right into the individual reproduction of the mining workers. Quite early on the main trade union apparatus converged with moneylenders and labour contractors, who in turn were often foremen in the mines or former 'village-leaders' who now trafficked labour-power between villages and mining areas. In the early 1970s it was reported that around 40 to 50 per cent of all mining workers were indebted to moneylenders, who often extorted money on payday, with the help of the upper-hierarchy. This network reached into the 'reproduction sphere' in form of gambling dens, illegal distilleries and into the sphere of unofficial mining.

The re-structuring during the nationalisation process opened various gaps between the centralised command and workers reproduction, between different groups of workers, between different sectors and departments of the emerging 'state-run company'. The 'mafia' mediated between these gaps both economically – in form of contractors or managers of illegalised mines – and politically, as part of the trade unions and within the political burocracy. The 'mafia' emerged as a quasi outsourced economical and political department of the now centralised state-industry. With the large-scale replacement of work-force during the first weeks of nationalisation, the so-called 'ghost-workers' appeared on the pay-roll. People with 'connections' managed to get a salaried job in CIL without actually working there. With the vast merger of nationalisation lot of contracts has to be re-shifted, the 'mafia' took over most of the transport contracts, which also functioned as interfaces to the now more drastically illegalised mines. From foremen to medium management, the new contractual conditions enabled many to yield some 'extra-income'. By 1981 it was said that the CIL subsidiary Bharat Coking Coal Limited (BCCL) in Dhanbad had about 5,000 paid 'elements' on their pay-roll, people who could also be used as thugs against unruly workers. [11]

By the late 1970s after the end of the Emergency the Congress, the 'Party of Independence' became contested for the first time and lost elections in 1977. From now on the trade unions became even more important factors in the faction fights within the political class. The 'mafia dons', who had started their careers as transport contractors and union leaders, became politicians. In 1978 B.P. Sinha, who had been a mafia/union leader close to the INTUC/Congress was killed, Suraj Deo Singh formed a new union Janata Mazdoor Sangh (JMS) close to the now ruling Janata Dal and became elected as an MLA from Jharia. The 'mafia/party'-infight reached a peak and dozens were killed within a few weeks time. The Government of India set up a special cell (Dhanbad) in the Home Ministry. The officer chosen to head the Special Cell was K. N. Prasad, a well-known Emergency hawk. He warned that "stringent action will be taken to stop forcible collection from the workers by moneylenders and trade union leaders … Action will also be taken to stop gherao, wildcat strikes and violent demonstration". One of the first measures suggested by the Home Ministry official was the arrest of key BCKU leaders – the BKCU was a fairly militant working class organisation and probably one of the few official forces not attached to the mafia.

While it is not surprising that both INTUC/RCMS union and JMS union saw workers, at best, as union-due paying foot-soldiers for the political power fight and based their main influence on the collaboration with the CIL management, the development of the BCKU seems more complex. The BCKU's dominating figure was A.K. Roy, who was expelled from the CPI(M) for Naxalite deviations in the late 1960s. He went to the Dhanbad mining area and organised mainly contract mining workers. Like Shankar Niyogi in the Rajhera mining area he had to face violent attacks by both the mining management and the main trade unions cum mafia. The combination of these violent confrontations and Maoist ideology lead the BCKU to mobilise the mining workers not only as 'workers', but they joined the regionalist and 'indigenous' propaganda of the emerging Jharkhand Movement – see next section. Like the mafia trade unions the BCKU leadership tried to enter the political arena in the form of the Marxist Coordination Committee (MCC), A.K. Roy was elected as a MLA while being imprisoned during Emergency.

In some ways the murder of Gurudas Chatterjee, the MCC MLA in April 2000 by remnants of the Dhanbad Mafia was the sad end of an era. We can say that by the mid 1990s the 'neoliberal reforms' (formal outsourcing of mining activities, general casualisation of labour and decline of trade unions), the new economic and political opportunities (real estate bubble and 'success' of the regionalist Jharkhand Movement) dissolved the 'mafia'. The 'gaps' between state, capitalist command and wider (re-)production process which had been opened during the process of nationalisation were closed by 'neoliberal liquidity' or could now be filled by 'normal' economical and political business. The mafia had shaped the class relations in Dhanbad for two decades. Workers had to deal with the mafia in form of various (money-lending, job-trafficking) middlemen and collectively in form of repressive trade unions – and the mafia had offered 'career and business opportunities' to workers of a certain strata. The Jharkhand Movement was the other main social-political factor in the mining areas of the 1970s to 1990s, which mobilised sections of the working class on the bases of its segmented existence and promised a better future through regional class collaboration.

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IIIc. The Jharkhand Movement

The state Jharkhand was formed in November 2000, before that the mining areas of Dhanbad-Jharia and the steel manufacturing regions around Bokaro and Jamshedpur were situated in the southern part of Bihar. A regionalist 'Jharkhand Movement' emerged in the 1920s, but only gained significant influence with the constitution of the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (Jharkhand Liberation Front, JMM) in 1972 by Shibu Soren.

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There was a material base for this regionalist tendency, in the sense of 'regional bourgeois interests' and the possibility to link this interest to populist politics able to mobilise a significant share of the local proletarian / small peasantry population. The main factor in terms of regional bourgeois interest is the concentration of Bihar's mineral wealth in its southern part and the concentration of the subsequent industrial investments. The initial stages of the regionalist movement can be explained as a clash between the interests of industrial capital in the south with the mainly agrarian ruling class in wider Bihar.

The formation of a 'regionalist' popular identity, like the formation of most identities, was an effort 'in hindsight'. Initially the historical-cultural justification for the constitution of an 'independent' Jharkhand was based on the 'adivasi' (indigenous/tribal) identity of a significant amount of the local population, an "ethnic differences between the people of Chhotanagpur and Santhal Parganas and the people of north Bihar". The category 'adivasi' is mainly a product of colonial population management, summarising various regional, tribal and caste formations. 'Left-wing' identitarian ideology became part of the tool-box for regionalist liberation movements, e.g. the 'adivasis' were portrayed as a 'rebellious' and 'egalitarian' community. "Tribal revolts like the Kol Rebellion, the Santhal Rebellion or the Birsa Movement are well known. The famous Santhal insurrection of 1855 was against the introduction of the British administration and land tenure systems." "Their societies are community-based with land owned communally. Community life is cooperative and based on sharing, with decisions taken jointly through consensus. They consider their societies classless, egalitarian and close to nature." [12] This left-wing community-building leaves out that amongst the 'adivasis' there were tribes worshipping kings who, by birth-right, owned half of the village land. It also leaves out that before the 'adivasi'-identity became a promising ticket in southern Bihar, many 'tribals' were eager to integrate themselves into the higher-up caste hierarchy, e.g. the 'tribal' Mahatos (settled in Jharkhand, but originally from Bengal) were recognised as caste Kurmis by 1929 and claimed caste kinship with Marathas or Patidars far away from Bihar.

Due to the mining work related labour migration starting from the late 19th century the 'tribal' population became minoritarian and marginalised in the region of south Bihar – the mine owners replaced the local village workers increasingly with migrant workers. The 'regional bourgeoisie', too, was actually formed by 'outsiders' who came to the region around the turn of the last century. Therefore the Jharkhand Liberation Movement had to extend their cultural regional identity to a wider identity: the Jharkhandis, a category even blurrier than the tribal category. With such a recent history of migration it became difficult to define who is an 'outsider' and who is a Jharkhandi. Schools tried to elaborate on the 'Jharkhandi dialect from the 1970s onwards, but the main help in this difficult task of self-identification was given by yet another shift of local class composition during nationalisation 1971 – 73 and during Emergency 1975, when thousands of 'local' mining workers (allegedly mainly adivasis and dalits) were replaced by new batches of migrant workers. The 'rural poor' in the region had suffered varies similar blows in recent history, e.g. during the first three Five Year Plans of the 1950s and 1960s, more than 50,000 'scheduled tribe' families and 10,000 'scheduled caste' families in the region were uprooted from their homes to make land available for the construction of public sector industrial projects. The total number of displaced families would higher if we consider the private sector industries and remember that coal mines, at that time, were in the private sector. The fact that 'local' people have been displaced during the 1950s and 1960s and the fact that they now lost jobs in the 1970s opened space for 'regionalist ideologies' within the local proletariat.

The emergence of the Maoist-influenced union movement in the late 1960s gave the regionalist tendencies more credibility amongst the lower section of the working class. Being under full-attack from management, state, main trade unions and mafia, the Maoist-influenced union movement tried to widen and strengthen their struggle amongst the 'most down-trodden' by appealing to regionalist forces. The fact that initially the Jharkhand liberation movement got engaged in campaigns against 'outside' moneylenders appealed to the Maoists. The Jharkhand Mukti Morcha was formed together with the MCC in 1972. Instead of tackling the question of divisions within the working class in terms of 'class composition', the Maoist ideology of peasant-workers alliance was re-shaped in regionalist terms: the 'peasantry' was turned into the 'Jharkhandi rural population'. This was later to be repeated, e.g. by the People's War Group (PWG) in their support for regionalist movements in Andhra Pradesh. At the time the Maoist ideologues expressed this political decision as follows: "The Jharkhand struggle, apart from being directed against the real exploiters and oppressors, is also directed against another oppressed class – the working class. In a sense the situation is similar to the relations between the privileged working class in the imperialist countries and the peasants in colonies." They described the situation of the 'privileged' permanent mining workers from 'outside' as follows: "Under the peculiar situation of class struggles in Jharkhand they have two options open to them – either to rally with their hated caste brothers in the name of ethnic solidarity [outside bourgeoisie], or to oppose them and uphold the point of class-solidarity with the downtrodden Jharkhandis. But they do neither and, as a result, there is complete confusion about their role vis-a-vis Jharkhand movement." [13]

The MCC initial alliance with the 'regional bourgeoisie' would not only create confusion within the working class, it also turned against the Maoists movement itself – although the current 'insurrectionist' Maoist guerrilla can not be equated with the MCC as such. As early as 1975 the 'liberation movement' started to intensify the tension between different 'proletarian sections', leading to, e.g. the Chirudih massacre which left eleven 'outsiders' dead. During the 1980s the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha found followers amongst the big land-owners, for example the zamindar Basant Narayan Singh, amongst big industrialist – and last, but not least amongst the 'mafia'. In November 2000 Jharkhand became an independent state. From 2002 onwards the Jharkhand state started to mobilise para-military troops, for example in form of the Nagrik Suraksha Samiti (NSS), against the armed Maoists movement operating in Jharkhand. Ironically enough the 'Red Army war-fare' of the Maoists led to an increasing 'Mafia-isation' of the Maoists themselves. In order to finance their 'people's army' they have to raise 'taxes' from small coal mines, timber and tendu leaf contractors, petrol pumps – allegedly they also get involved in poppy plantations and other lucrative business. By 2006 the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha 'tribal' leader Shibu Soren had become Indian Minister for Coal – in November of the same year he was charged with involvement in bribe-related murder. In 2010 the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha started closer collaboration with the Hindu-nationalist BJP. In general we cannot say that the new Jharkhandi state treats the 'Jharkhandis' with much more respect that its predecessor: in April 2011 the state forces killed a dozen people protesting against displacement. The current displacement drive in the Dhanbad-Jharia region threatens around half a million people.

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IIId. The Mechanization

One of the 'aims' of centralisation of mining capital under the state umbrella in the early 1970s was to further mechanisation. The next phase of mechanisation was accompanied by a massive shift in work-force after nationalisation 1973 – capital wanted to combine a fresh work-force with the new technology; and it was politically accompanied by the heavy blanket of state of Emergency from 1975 to 1977. Like in most other industries the Emergency was a peak-time of retrenchments, work intensification and re-structuring in the mining industry of Dhanbad. In 1978 the Munidih Project was declared the first fully mechanised mine in Asia after mechanised 'self-advancing' longwall technology was introduced for the first time in Indian mining history. Mining capital literally tried to escape from the troubled surface of the mining region, the Munidih Project became one of India's deepest mines. The brutal force of mechanised road headers drove one part of the local working class 500 metres down into the earth, while another part was subjected to the personal violence of labour intensive regime in the unofficial mines nearby. The control over the mechanical automation of the early 1980s was intensified by the introduction of micro-electronics from the mid-1980s onwards.

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During the 1980s the cogs of mechanisation met two related resisting dynamics: the struggles of workers in and against the re-structuring and the profit squeeze. Most of the 'anti-mechanisation' struggles reported are struggles of workers who would potentially be retrenched by the labour-saving consequences – there is little documentation of struggles 'within and against the machine'. In the 1980s in a mining area in neighbouring West Bengal workers' resistance brought a prestigious joint-venture project to a stand-still. Continued agitation by those being displaced and the contract workers employed for digging the shaft, forced the Russian corporation and CIL to abandon the experimental Nakrakonda project (which was meant to test the equipment and machinery before they were deployed on a large scale). The union leaders of the CITU, INTUC and AITUC signed various agreements accepting the demands of the management. This attitude of the main unions was and is wide-spread: acceptance of and collaboration in the re-structuring process in turn for recognition as the representing body of the then reduced core work-force. We document another example from 2002, which reveals the limits of 'anti-mechanisation' struggles.
In 2002 CIL management re-opened an open cast mining project in Koyagudem (Yellandu). The extraction begun with surface miner instead of the shovel and dumper, drastically reducing the number of workers necessary (from 317 to 18). On 5th October 2002 a thousand people were mobilized to obstruct the work of the surface miner – half of them were peasants and agricultural labourers mobilized from surrounding villages, 200 were coal miners and 300 were workers of motor transport, tiles and loaders. The mobilisation was accompanied by a radical-left splinter party. After remaining stalled for 55 days, work with the surface miner was recommenced by the management and contractor on 31st December under the cover of a massive police force. On 10th January the Parirakshana Union Committee called for encircling the Koyagudem open-cast mine and 4000 workers with hundreds of other people laid a seize that day. The ensuing gathering movement described above led to all unions giving a joint call for indefinite strike. Armed police manned the mines, residential colonies of workers and the offices. Hundreds of people including coal miners, were arrested daily, several lathi charges were resorted to. The strike continued for 15 days. However on 7th February 2003, four trade unions of Singareni Parirakshan Committee concluded an agreement with the management and abruptly called off the strike.

By the late 1980s the mechanisation drive rammed into the profit squeeze: out-put productivity might had been increased, total coal production doubled during the 1980s, but production costs per ton were not lowered too a more profitable level. In 1986-87 the Coal India Limited accumulated losses stood at 18,000 million Rs. Again the main trade unions became part-takers of managing 'contradictive productivity'. In 1988 a committee which included top CIL officials and representatives of INTUC, AITUC and CITU concluded that "High OMS [out-put per man-shift] does not necessarily mean cost minimisation; between 1980-81 and 1985-86 while the wage cost per tonne of coal went up from Rs 73.18 to Rs 103.51, the total cost per tonne of coal went up from Rs 123.12 to Rs 214.20 per tonne. There was an increase in the real cost of production of coal as the price index rose by less than the 75 per cent increase in cost of production." A concrete example was the Rajmahal Coal Mining Project in Jharkhand, at the time Asia's largest open-cast coal mine. In the late 1980s it employed a workforce of only 2,400, most operations were automatised. But the production cost of coal were said to be 440 Rs per ton, whereas the sale price at the time was around 260 per ton.

In a way these conditions in the coal mining industry were symptomatic for the wider industrial environment and India's economic situation as a whole. The state, as a major capitalist enterprise, defaulted under accumulated debts. In 1991 the Indian state had to declare that foreign exchange reserves were depleted and that it will not be able to pay back its foreign debts. A loan program was set-up and the 'external loan conditions' were used in order to attack the working class in India with a state regulated pressure of market-forces: liberalisation of the domestic market, lowering of trade barriers, privatisation. In the official mining industry the attack on labour costs took the form of redundancies and large scale casualisation of workers throughout the 1990s – we give a short overview on this period in the following section.

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IIIe. The Casualisation and (Re-)Privatisation

During the late 1980s and early 1990s the Dhanbad-Munidih area witnessed a series of 'independent' mining workers strikes, which challenged CIL management as much as they defied the main unions and the mafia itself. On 16th of December 1988 the piece-rated workers in all mines of area 7 went on strike. Unrest continued till July-August 1990, workers actively fought back mafia attacks. Subsequently two workers were killed in a police firing during a state attack on strikers. In late 1992 several thousand workers went on wildcat strike in area 6 open-cast project and forced management to take back on workers who they had dismissed earlier on. Workers had tried to prevent management from introducing 26 days pay for a 30 days working month.

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These movements demonstrated that the clutch of the main trade unions and the mafia had weakened. The problem for the Dhanbad CIL workers was that ironically the repressive union and mafia apparatus was dissolved by the same force which also managed to isolate and undermine the very position of the workers themselves: the liquid and dissolving force of the neoliberal regime. During the 1990s the personal clout of moneylenders was increasingly replaces by the impersonal terror of micro-credits, the paternalistic regime of the old village leaders by internationally funded NGOs, the 'illegal mines' became outsourced 'logistics' departments, the old union leader cum labour contractor were increasingly replaced by human resource management and the old mafia don shifted their business interest from the dirty sphere of production process towards the emerging real estate bubble. Having escaped the paternalistic grasp of the union-mafia, the hard-core of mining-workers of Dhanbad did not find an answer to the slow-motion of de-composition during the 1990s.

During the 1990s the mining industry witnessed a kind of reversed repetition of the pre-nationalisation period: a slow default of the industry, a loan from international credit institutions (World Bank), which was used in order to finance re-structuring; major shifts in the composition of the work-force. This time, instead of 'nationalisation', the regime moves in the direction of 'formal privatisation'. The 'privatisation' is accompanied by a general hiring stop for permanent workers – wages for the post-1992 hired contracted workers are around 10 per cent of the wages of the CIL permanent workers. The prestigious Munidih Project mine, which employed over 8,000 permanent workers in the early 1980s now employs less than 2,000 permanents. The other main shift is the brutal expansion of open-cast mining. The main investments go into dynamite, diggers and trucks – what is left is a labour-saving battle-field of extraction, a ripped landscape. Open-cast mining increases the division between a relatively small work-force and a local impoverished proletariat. The open-cast drive explains the rapid increase of total CIL coal production from 200 Mt in 1992 to 430 Mt in 2010.

In the following we have a brief look at the 'controlled default' of CIL during the 1990s. The accumulated losses of CIL had reached 25,000 million Rs by 1991, which were mainly outstanding liabilities to the government of India. In 1993 the CIL approached the World Bank for a 500 million USD loan for investments into the company – actually most of the money was used to finance the retrenchment of about 140,000 workers during the following years. Referring to the 'external pressure' and the conditions attached to the World Bank loan the CIL management and the Indian state started to provide the legal steps for further outsourcing and casualisation of the industry. In 1994, the state in India amended its Coal Mines Nationalization Act allowing foreign companies to hold a 51 percent stake in Indian coal mines. In order to attract investment the government of India waived 9,000 million Rs liabilities for CIL in 1995. In the same year a major conference hosted by CIL and 50 NGO's took place in Kolkata in order to find ecologically and socially 'sustainable' ways for the large-scale open-cast mining drive. The 'agreements' of the conference later on appeared as proof for the 'developmental character' of the World Bank loan. According to government sources – not the most critical source – less than 35 per cent of displaced people get re-habilitated and the fact that CIL pledged to cut down its workforce in return for the loans also meant that displaced people would never get a permanent job in the actual mines.

After 2000, mining became big international business again – fuelled by the energy demand of the emerging markets and the general shareholder and commodity speculation boom. Total coal production in India increased nearly seven-fold during 1980 to 2010 – but the higher degree of integration into the world market does not mean that 'India' resources are plundered by imperialism, like some lefty critics of 'liberalisation' keep on preaching. Since the 'wider opening of the market' in 1991, coal imports have increased significantly in addition to the hikes in total domestic production. The quantitative and qualitative shifts in the energy regime also reflect the changing position of India in world capitalism.

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Today single open-cast mines in the Dhanbad area are outsourced to international logistics companies with their own workforce, while 'Indian' steel companies like Tata or Mittal source directly from the global market by buying mines in Australia, Africa or the US. Part of this 'shining mining boom' is the increasing militarization of the mining areas. The tension between an increasingly marginalised rural proletariat and a hyper-productive mining industry is expressed in the 'anti-development' struggles of the early 2000s and the 'Operation Greenhunt' – the mobilisation of over 100,000 paramilitary state forces in the mining-jungle areas as part of the 'anti-Maoist' counter-insurgency. The military has to guarantee investment friendly conditions, last but not least because with the onset of the global crisis in 2008 the Indian state finance itself depends on stable share prices: in October 2010 the Indian state sold ten per cent of its shares in Coal India Ltd. It was India's biggest initial public offering ever and raised more than 3.5 billion USD to be thrown into the black hole of state fiscal deficit.

There have been various short strikes and mobilisation by CIL mining workers against 'retrenchments and privatisation'. The fact that these mobilisations remained rather insignificant cannot be explained by the 'collaborating' character of the main unions, but by the already very undermined position of the permanent work-force by the end of the 2000s. The final part of this report is a more impressionistic account of the situation in Dhanbad today, based on a two weeks visit and conversations with mining workers.

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IIIf. The Situation Today: A Visit in Dhanbad

In the Dhanbad-Jharia coal-fields we met up with permanent mining workers employed by the CIL subsidiary Bharat Coking Coal Limited (BCCL) – mainly employed as skilled mechanics. They have been working in the Dhanbad mines since the late 1970s – during the early 1980s they became members of the Revolutionary Socialist Party / Marxist-Leninist (RSP-ML). The RSP-ML split from the RSP in 1969, critical of the parliamentarist turn of the latter. It remained a fairly small political organisation, mainly composed of skilled workers in the old industries like mining, steel manufacturing or the railways. The party emphasises 'the revolutionary program' and the 'development of class consciousness'. Trade unions are regarded as capitalist institutions, which divert class struggle into economism and they see Trotzkyism, Stalinism and Maoism as bourgeois deviations. Despite the – compared to other communist parties – very working-class base of the party, their monthly party organ 'Kranti Yug' (Revolutionary Era), hardly reflects the proletarian experience of the organisation and mainly focuses on 'general politics and their communist interpretation'.

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The RSP-ML can be seen as politically attractive for 'class conscious workers' like the mining workers comrades in Dhanbad for various reasons. The fact that the party puts a lot of emphasis on 'theoretical work and positions' matches the more educated background of these skilled workers. Some of the Dhanbad comrades had been politicised during their participation in the J.P. Movement (Bihar Movement) in the mid-1970s and during Emergency. Their working-times of 8-hour shifts, which could often be shortened unofficially, and a weekly day off allowed to spend time for party activities and study circles. Most of them joined the party individually, after having been convinced of the correctness of its position. The actual day-to-day experiences with trade unions in the mining area and the results of Maoist 'regionalist alliances' confirmed the main party lines. But given the rapid changes, the skilled permanent miners find themselves materially marginalised within the new class composition. Their emphasis on 'class consciousness' as a precondition for revolutionary struggle becomes more and more a tautological straw to cling onto in order to compensate the feeling of social isolation. The young generation of workers does not use 'political jargon' they don't have time and resources for party activities. The 'old communists' denounce them as 'egoistic', because they only think about their 'individual problems' and not in 'class terms'. The 'class consciousness' of these old workers becomes a cocoon out of which all single conflicts in the area can be interpreted as 'merely economistic'. The party has become isolated and does not find a practical way to relate to the multi-faced and facetted working class and its material separations – having a look at the different 'conflicts' in the area we can assess the difficulty of finding the 'class program' within a process of both self-organisation and generalisation.

After spending a few days in Dhanbad-Jharia you are surprised about the large amounts of 'conflicts' in the area. You stumble into protest demonstrations in front of administration offices or sit-down actions in front of mine gates and half of the local news in the mainstream newspapers covers some kind of protest related to the mines. At the same time it is obvious that each proletarian group struggles 'on the bases of it's own specific relation to the mines and for its specific demands', represented by their respective institutions: permanent workers, workers hired through contractors, unemployed, displaced villagers. In the following we give a brief overview on conflicts in spring 2011.

The permanent mining workers

The comrades say that the struggles of the permanent workers are shaped by the fact that their total numbers have been reduced to about a third within the last three decades – in Munidih Project even to a quarter of their strength in the 1980s. These old core workers are still under attack. In July 2009, BCCL management announced to shift 10,000 permanent workers from various mines in Jharia to other mines – which was seen as a provocation and a possible instigation to get the workforce engaged in struggles, which could lead to retrenchments. In October 2010 CIL announced to cut its workforce by another 10 per cent in the coming two years. In the official mines permanent workers form about 40 per cent of the manual workforce today, most of the hard jobs are done by the younger and much worse paid contracted workers. A comrade said that the official protests against privatisation of CIL are weak: in April 2010 CIL workers were supposed to go on strike against the CIL share sales, but three of the main trade unions reached a deal with Indian Coal Minister on 16th of April and ended any involvement – part of the agreement was that permanent CIL workers would be offered company shares at a special price. The comrade continued that some struggles developed in the outsourced mines once the new management wanted to introduce worse working-conditions for the remaining 'old CIL workers' – these struggles are more direct, but remain isolated. During early March 2011, various permanent workers unions in several mines announced work-to-rule token strikes in order to enforce the 9th wage agreement. The protest remained marginal even within the permanent workforce.

The workers hired through contractors

After 1992 no workers have been hired as permanents, all production workers are since then hired through contractors. They now form 60 per cent of the work-force in Bharat Coking Coal Limited (BCCL). While permanent workers earn between 700 Rs and 1,000 Rs a day and receive company health care, company accommodation and other benefits, the workers hired through contractors are paid 100 Rs a day and they receive no extra benefits. Most of the workers hired through contractors are not unionised. On 8th of March 2011, when permanent workers unions announced the token strike for the wage agreement, security guards employed through a private company in a Jharia mine protested in front of the mine administration office, demanding outstanding wages. The last time that permanent and temporary workers in Munidih Project fought together was in November 2010 after a temporary worker had died after an accident. Both groups of workers went on two-three days wildcat strike demanding compensation for the family, which the management agreed to in the end. At the same 8th of March 2011, unorganised sector workers (from unofficial mines and coal processing plants) organised by the BCKU held a protest rally in front of main administration in Barora and Block 2, demanding the payment of minimum wages and the implementation of other 'statutory rights'.

The unemployed

The separation between the individual groups is the most full-on when it comes to 'fathers and sons'. While the fathers might still work as permanent miners for CIL, their sons are organised in local unemployed unions, protesting and blockading to demand permanent jobs. The sons of permanent workers are very unlikely to continue working in the local mines – they would not want to work for 10 per cent of their father's wage. The 'unemployed movement' is mainly comprised of miners' sons or sons of the middle-peasantry – it is sometimes organised by a displaced village community. During our visit protests were organised around a local captive power plant in Munidih. BCCL had subcontracted the plant to a private company. The 'new 'power plant would employ around 200 people. The private company hired only 20 people from local villages directly, the rest either came from 'outside' or hired through contractor on 100 Rs daily wages. In March 2011, the local young unemployed, most of them sons of BCCL permanent workers, some of them sons of the RSP(ML) comrades, staged a protest in front of the power plant. They formed the 'Unemployed Youth Organisation' and demanded 60 permanent jobs for each of the two nearby villages. The power plant management postponed the hiring process and the start of production, but at first refused negotiations. The 'Unemployed Youth Organisation' – around 80 to 100 people – staged demonstrations, continued the blockade of the power plant and announced a hunger strike. In April 2011 the power plant management agreed to hiring 50 people from each of the villages. While the 'Unemployed Youth Organisation' demonstrated at the power plant, in around 5 km distance 20 people of 'Unemployed Unity Platform' staged a one-day protest in front of the main mine. Mainly comprised of former local farmers they claimed that they have been displaced by BCCL mines and demanded permanent jobs. They put forward a demand notice and threatened to 'blockade' the mine.

Either 'unemployed protest' or going far away for work. Given the relatively high income of their fathers, a lot of them have received a 'good education'. Some managed to get 'good jobs', for example as mechanics for the Indian Air Force in Chandigarh. Others migrated to Mumbai or Delhi, in order to work in a call centre, as in one case, or in a lift manufacturing company, as in a different case. Compared to their parents' situation, their conditions are dire. They have to move around to find temporary jobs, which don't pay enough to either maintain the current standard of living of their parents' generation, or allow the 'educational expenses' for a future generation. "My dad works on 8-hours shifts, but in the mines they still manage to leave the job early. Someone will clock out for you. If you have the right job, for example in maintenance, you might work 4 or 6 hours a day. We have to put up with 10 or 12 hours shifts".

The displaced villagers

Many villages are directly affected by mining: displacement, pollution, burnt-up agriculture land, polluted water; or/and they claim their share in the mining in form of permanent jobs or 'infrastructural investment'. On 8th of March 2011 villagers in Paharigora blockaded rail-tracks, mainly used by the coal mines, in order to demand better water supply. Their water had been dried up mainly by the coal washeries and other mining operations. On 27th of April 2011 police killed two protestors in Dhanbad by gun-shot and injured more than a dozen. People had been protesting the anti-encroachment drive at a Bharat Coking Coal Limited (BCCL) colony located in Kusunda and Matkuria, about 8 kms from Dhanbad. People set fire to about 16 vehicles, out of which 11 belonged to the BCCL authorities. State police headquarters said people of the area started pelting stones at the administration team, which went for the eviction of local people allegedly occupying BCCL quarters.

The guerrilla warfare in the mining fringe areas

The Maoist armed insurrection sees the mining area first of all as an 'economic power-base' of the enemy, less as a territory of class struggle. They blow up rail-tracks in the impoverished fringes, hoping to put pressure on the government and mining capital. On 8th of February 2011 Maoists blew up train tracks in three places in the Dhanbad railway division disrupting traffic for hours. The traffic on the important Coal India Chord (CIC) remained disrupted from 2am to 10.30am till the tracks were restored. On 5th of March Maoist guerrillas attacked police posts in nearby Balumath, killing two. They subsequently blew up rail-tracks. On 3rd of May 2011 eleven policemen were killed and at least 20 injured when Maoists ambushed a police team in Lohardaga district of Jharkhand. On 21st of May 2011 a 48-hour 'strike' called by the Maoists has evoked mixed response. The strike hardly had any impact in urban areas, including Jamshedpur. The strike affected mainly shops and transport companies in the 'Maoist affected rural areas'. On 5th of June the Times of India reported: "Hundreds of landless villagers have taken control of 210 bighas vested land in Khanpur village of Murarai on the Jharkhand border. Men armed with axes, scythes and sticks stood guard as their comrades plowed the land with tractors and sowed paddy seeds"…

Conclusion

The impoverishment of the proletariat in the mining areas, the destructive character of the industry and the repressive nature of the state regime clearly show the NECESSITY for social transformation towards a class-less society – but only the productive collectivity of the working class can express the POTENTIAL for creating this different society. In Dhanbad area the borderlines between 'impoverishment of the proletariat' and 'social productivity of the working class' are blurry, but they exist and their over-coming poses the major challenge for a class movement. In other terms: the divisions between different segments of the working-class cannot be done away with by mere preaching of a 'class position'. With the trap of regionalism out of the way and internationalism imposed by the industrial set-up itself the proletariat can start from its different conditions and find common trajectories in their actions. Let's document and debate our experiences – here 'old' organisations like the RSP(ML) – or rather their communist working class militants – are put to the test.

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Footnotes

[1] http://sanhati.com/articles/3490/

[2] http://www.worldcoal.org/coal/coal-mining/
http://www.indiaenergyportal.org/overview_detail.php

[3]http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/30/1/Sanchez_Workers_Netas_and_Goondas.pdf

[4]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sindri

[5]Interesting documentary on Dhanbad
http://www.cultureunplugged.com/documentary/watch-online/filmedia/play/1169/Hot-As-Hell—Dhanbad-s-Dons

[6]http://www.scribd.com/doc/7530719/Labour-Movement-in-India1945

[7]Work and Time: The Everyday Lives of the Jharia Coalfield Mazdoors,
1890s-1970s – Mr. Dhiraj Kumar Nite

[8]Interesting document on situation in coal belts in 1958:
http://www.indialabourarchives.org/usr/local/gsdl/cgi-bin/library?e=q-000-00—0ail-aituc%2chemant%2cindrani%2cwet%2coral%2cbms%2ctexah-01-0-0-0prompt-14-Document-stx–0-1l–1-en-50—20-about-1958–001-001-1-0isoZz-8859Zz-1-0&a=d&c=aituc&cl=search&d=HASHa184d1cc86d3ad5921c4eb.129

[9]Nationalisation by Default: The Case of Coal in India Rajiv Kumar

[10]Chhattisgarh Mines Shramik Sangh was formed on 3 March 1977 at Dalli Rajhara in southern Durg district.
http://gurgaonworkersnews.wordpress.com/workers-history/#fn61

[11]DHANBAD Miners' Fight against Imposters, Amiya Rao, (December 12, 1981)

[12]Class and Tribe in Jharkhand Nirmal Sengupta (EPW 1980)

[13]Jharkhand Movement, January 10, 1976 (EPW)

4 Responses to "Overview of Coal Mining in India: Investigative Report from Dhanbad Coal Fields"

  1. Ravikant Dubey Says: 
    June 23rd, 2011 at 9:28 am

    However your Investigation report is titled as "Overview of Coal Mining in India: Investigative Report from Dhanbad Coal Fields at Sanhati" and so it seems like reporting about the history of Coal capital of India, but i am disappointed that its not the same actually, but just a glimpse of something virtually known about dhanbad to everyone. I had been there for as long as 20 years of my life and know what exactly social and economical life among the different classes of society is staying there…but the fact is that the unstable government and the political parties and their approach made the Dhanbad, probably the most rich city for its minerals offering into a burning city..Jharia the most precious coal belt of dhanbad is today struggling for its existence..city is reeling under pain of relocation and most sadly there is nothing the Jharkhand Gov is doing…

  2. prem pandey Says: 
    September 14th, 2011 at 12:13 am

    Yes, it is fact, but i want to heighlight the basic in the field of coal/coke, more corruption was done by Testing companey they are totally give and take rules follow give money what you want the results given to you.

  3. prem pandey Says: 
    September 14th, 2011 at 12:17 am

    more coal marchant & testing companey head are mutual understand,if you go to servey found that.maximum are money & power, kal tak jo kuch nahi tha aaj wo lakhpati hai, if you search most of testing & certification companey employees are.

  4. rudradev kumar Says: 
    October 22nd, 2011 at 3:20 pm

    i had been living in dhanbad since my childhood till age of 20 years.the situation of dhanbad has changed from good to bad.but the potential of coal mines over there can be upgraded and more employement can be generated there.but un-fortunetely,due to reluctance og gov it is not being done.

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